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ABSTRACT
This study examines a major law-and-development project
in Africa undertaken by the New York-based Ford Foundation
in the decades following the Second World War. By the 1960s,
many countries in Africa freed themselves of colonial rule, and
Ford eagerly sought to assist these newly emerging states in
the nation-building process. One area towards which Ford con-
tributed considerable resources was legal education. Labeling
its program "SAILER"-or the Staffing of African Institutions
of Legal Education and Research-Ford engaged in a range of
initiatives, including sending American lawyers to teach in sev-
eral different African countries and bringing Africans to law
schools in the United States to study.
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The paper here evaluates this Ford initiative by relying pri-
marily on three sources of original data: a review of all of
Ford's archival documents on SAILER; interviews with former
affiliates of SAILER residing in the United States; and archival
research and interviews conducted in Africa during parts of
2010 and 2011. As the findings reveal, the story of this project
is more complicated than the conventional wisdom might sug-
gest. To begin, SAILER was not a single, monolithic program,
nor was its mission to advance some grand Cold War, Ameri-
can foreign policy objective. Furthermore, the Africans with
whom SAILER-officials worked were not all desperately yearn-
ing for assistance from the United States; many were sophisti-
cated individuals simply interested in finding ways to enhance
the rule of law in their respective countries. SAILER thus was
seen as one potential vehicle for achieving this goal. And im-
portantly, the attitudes of and strategies employed by, those
involved with SAILER-both in the United States and in
Africa-were not static; they were nuanced and they evolved
throughout the course of the project. By 1977, SAILER officially
ended, but as this study concludes, the reasons were layered,
and they related to contextual factors within Africa as much
as to the internal decisions within Ford itself
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s, the United States witnessed a series of defining
moments, including the historic Civil Rights Movement, tragic po-
litical assassinations, and the rapid escalation of involvement in
Vietnam. According to historians Maurice Isserman and Michael
Kazin, those on the left and the right in this tumultuous decade
"hotly disputed the morality of their opponents' values, language,
and behavior and differed sharply and, at times, violently about how
to build a society of individuals at peace with themselves and the
rest of the world."1 In another part of the world-Africa-the 1960s
similarly served as a pivotal period for a great many people who
had been challenging colonial norms and seeking to pave new
See MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL KAZIN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR OF THE 1960s,
293 (2000).
futures. In 1960 alone, seventeen African countries gained their
freedom, and between 1961 and 1970 another fifteen followed
suit.2 The vast majority of these African states had as their rulers
either Britain or France, with other Europeans exercising influence
elsewhere as well.3
The developments occurring in Africa did not go unnoticed
among interested observers in the United States. At the New York-
based non-profit organization, the Ford Foundation, officials had
begun taking a serious interest particularly in Anglo-phonic Africa.
Ford's traditional mission had been to provide financial resources
and human capital to governments and civil society activists for the
purposes of improving political stability, access to justice, and eco-
nomic and social welfare.4 Given the linguistic ability to work in
Anglo-phonic Africa, Ford policymakers started to contemplate how
best to offer assistance in meaningful ways that would also mesh
with the Foundation's agenda.
One area that soon became of focus was legal education. Dating
back to the mid-1950s, Ford had privileged legal education and had
funded "cooperative programs"' between American and foreign law
schools in countries like Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, West Germany, and
India.6 Ford, during the '50s, also financially supported foreign stu-
dents and foreign academics with fellowships to visit law schools in
the United States; and there was funding provided for delegation-
exchanges between American lawyers and foreign bar associations.7
The theory behind Ford's legal education initiatives was simple: for
these former colonies that now were free, strong legal systems were
required in order for democracy to flourish. To that end, there
needed to exist educational institutions that rigorously trained law
2 See Chronological List of Independence Dates for Africa, AFRICAN HISTORY: EXPLORE
THE HISTORY OF AFRICA, http://africanhistory.about.com/library/timelines/bllndepen
denceTime.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
Id.
4 See Mission Statement, FORD FOUNDATION, http://www.fordfound.org/about-us/
mission (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
1 See DON PRICE, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE OFFICERS: INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES (Oct. 16,
1955) (report on file with author); see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield
Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the Ford Foundation, and the Development of
Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 447, 450 (2004).
6 Id. at both cites.
Id. at both cites.
students to enter the legal profession with the necessary skills and
values to uphold the rule of law. And with a vibrant legal profession
and a democratic system of government, the likelihood of these
societies experiencing greater economic prosperity only increased.
This "law-and-development" model, as it soon came to be known,
was one that Ford followed into the 1960s and 1970s. It also served
as the basis for its legal involvement in Africa. In 1962, Ford officially
launched an initiative known as the Staffing of African Institutions
of Legal Education and Research-or SAILER. The stated purpose of
SAILER was to financially support law schools in African countries.
As importantly, it was to aid those governments that made "an ex-
press request for assistance . .. [and] to assist only those institutions
where SAILER teachers would be welcome and where their teaching
and research would add special dimensions or fill vital needs."" These
SAILER-teachers would be comprised of lawyers, law professors,
and recently-minted law graduates, mainly from the United States.
The duration of stay for these teachers was not inconsequential.
The project "urged that each teacher contemplate a minimum as-
signment of two years," 0 with the idea being that the Americans
were supposed to help not just train good lawyers but also immerse
themselves fully within the communities in which they worked.
So how did the SAILER project fare? That is the question this
article seeks to address. Although SAILER was most prominent dur-
ing the 1960s, it was not officially discontinued until 1977, and its
effects can be seen still today. This article evaluates the history, per-
formance, and influence of this Ford-Africa project. Along with a
review of the existing literature on this subject, the article relies on
three sources of original data. First, the Ford Foundation in New
York City granted the author unfiltered access to all of its SAILER-
related documents (spanning several hundred pages). Second, over
the course of several months in 2010 and 2011, the author inter-
8 For a discussion of this point on law and development, see Thomas F. Geraghty
& Emmanuel K. Quansah, African Legal Education: A Missed Opportunity and Sug-
gestions for Change: A Callfor Renewed Attention to a Neglected Means of Secur-
ing Human Rights and Legal Predictability, 5 Loy. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 87, 93 (2007).
9 See JOHNS. BAINBRIDGE, THE SAILER PROJECT: 1962-1967, FORD FOUNDATION DOCUMENT
7 (July 1967) (on file with author). See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPE-
RIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA, 43-50; 211-
12 (1980).
10 Id. at 8 (although also noting that exceptions could be made for one year or less).
viewed numerous American lawyers and American law professors
who were SAILER-participants; interviews were also conducted with
surviving Ford officials who were instrumental in envisioning and
administering SAILER. Third, during the summer of 2010, the author
traveled to Africa-in particular, to Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria
where SAILER had a pronounced presence."' (The author then re-
turned to Nigeria in May 2011.) In each of these countries, inter-
views were conducted with law professors, lawyers, judges, and
other legal professionals-many of whom were SAILER-students.
These data offer varied, nuanced, and, occasionally, critical per-
spectives on SAILER.
The thesis of this article is that, for what it endeavored to accom-
plish, SAILER achieved many of its goals. Moreover, it is helpful to
view SAILER within the framework of Ford's other major law-and-
development project that was ongoing during this same period in
India. Some years back this author published a detailed study of the
Ford-India program.'" As the findings from that research reveal, Ford's
India policymakers were intent on bringing an American-style legal
educational model to cities like Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi, Varanasi,
and Chennai.13 To that end, Ford devoted money and other re-
sources to Indian law schools in the hopes that they might adopt
the American law school approach.14 Yet, as the American consult-
ants (mainly American law professors) whom Ford hired to evaluate
its program observed, this plan was flawed from the start.s Ford
officials, according to the consultants, had little knowledge of South
Asia, nor were they sensitive to the cultural, historic, socio-eco-
nomic, political, and legal differences with the United States, which
made the wholesale incorporation of an American law school pro-
11 There were many other African countries in which SAILER was involved, in-
cluding Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Senegal, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. See JOHN S. BAINBRIDGE, STUDY AND TEACHING OF LAW IN AFRICA
178-179 (1972). Nigeria, Ghana, and Ethiopia were selected because a larger per-
centage of SAILER teachers worked in these countries than most of the others.
And, logistically, these three countries were simply more accessible in terms of
pursuing the fieldwork than most of the others. This point will be discussed in the
ensuing sections.




totype into India an all but impossible task.16 Ultimately; Ford aban-
doned these specific efforts by the early 1970s.' 7
In contrast, though, SAILER was differently conceived. As Section
One of this article shows, the imagination of SAILER was derived
from a set of entrepreneurial, anthropologically-attuned, and edu-
cationally focused Ford innovators and university-based legal schol-
ars."' Although many of these individuals were by birth Americans,
by academic and policymaking orientation they aspired to be
Africanists, who would eventually spend several years of their lives
living in different parts of Africa. After Section One outlines this
blueprint of SAILER, Section Two proceeds to examine how the pro-
gram functioned in Africa, in general.
Section Three then looks at what occurred in three of SAILER's
highly invested countries: Ethiopia, Ghana, and Nigeria. The docu-
ments from Ford reveal a host of proud similarities and successes
that emerged from the SAILER-efforts within these three places. But
these papers, together with interviews from a range of former
American and African SAILER-participants, highlight the differences
and nuances that served as challenges and frustrations to those in
New York and to those on the ground in the three countries. The
Section ends by discussing how macro-political factors resulted in
a shift in focus of the SAILER project by the late 1960s.
16 Id. For a valuable and important set of insights into how Western foreign-aid,
writ large, has proven to be problematic, see WILuAM EASTERLY, THE WHITE MAN'S BUR-
DEN: WHY THE WEST'S EFFORTS To AID THE REST HAVE DONE SO MUCH ILL AND So LITTLE GOOD
(2006).
1 See Krishnan, supra note 5. It is also important to situate Ford's SAILER pro-
gram with other activities in which it was involved during this time as well as other
on-going macro developments. For example, there was Ford's Foreign Area Fel-
lowship Program. Towards the end of the 1960s and through the 1970s, Ford de-
voted a great deal of time and resources to the Council for Legal Education and
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR), which was an initiative to inculcate clinical
training into American law schools. In addition, there was the passage of the 1958
National Defense and Education Act, which funded area and language studies. Dur-
ing the 1960s, the African Studies Association grew as well, and universities saw a
growth in African studies courses and programs. Great thanks to Professor Richard
Abel for highlighting these crucial contextual points. Author correspondence with
Abel (Aug. 16, 2011). See generally GARDNER, supra note 9.
's As will be seen, one of these officials, Theresa A. Wood, while working closely
with Ford and other Ford policymakers, was officially an employee of, first, the in-
dependent Institute of International Education, and then of the International Legal
Center, which although was a Ford creation too, was independent of Ford for offi-
cial documentation purposes.
The final section focuses on how, starting in 1967, Ford changed
its strategic emphasis from sending Americans abroad towards in-
stead bringing law students and legal professionals from Africa to
the United States. Ostensibly this move was made to enhance ed-
ucational opportunities for Africans. As it turned out, however,
once in the United States the Africans, like they had in Africa, edu-
cated the Americans in important ways. Otherwise put, the instruc-
tional arrows here pointed in two directions-with the Americans
providing substantive research and pedagogical opportunities to
the Africans, but with the Africans teaching their counterparts a
number of valuable lessons as well.
The findings below, thus, showcase two points. First, the Ameri-
can SAILER-teachers did not travel to Africa with the conscious in-
tent of engaging in a new form of colonialism. In fact, the Americans
understood that many of the African judges, lawyers, students, and
teachers they encountered had superior credentials (from places
like Oxford and Cambridge) and first-rate legal minds. Second, con-
trary to the conventional wisdom, African leaders actually invited
the Americans to participate in the process of improving legal edu-
cation. However, once the SAILER-participants arrived they received
important advice and input from their African hosts. In sum, for
those who are quick to label such law-and-development projects in
one blunt fashion or another, the story below illustrates that, at
least for SAILER, a proper analysis requires recognizing that these
cross-national relationships can be complicated, subtle, and often
non-linear.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SAILER PROJECT
A. The Initial Planning
Prior to the establishment of the Ford Foundation in 1936, the
two major American philanthropic organizations that existed were
the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.'9 By
1950, Ford shifted its headquarters from Michigan to New York and
carnegie was founded in 1911, Mission and Vision, CARNEGIE CORPORATION OF
NEW YORK, http://carnegie.org/about-us/mission-and-vision (last visited Nov. 18,
2011), and its institutional colleague, the Carnegie Foundation, in 1905. CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING http://www.carnegiefoundation.org
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011); Rockefeller was founded in 1913, THE ROCKEFELLER FOUN-
DATION www.rockefellerfoundation.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
refocused its mission towards international development; in doing
so, it unilaterally changed the landscape of large-scale American
philanthropy. One main reason was that Ford simply possessed so
much more money than its competitors.2 0 But while it had greater
financial capacity, the reputation of Ford, especially early-on, came
under great scrutiny. Aside from critics decrying it as an arm of the
United States government and as an exporter of American colonial-
ism, its wealthy founder, Henry Ford, was an open anti-Semite,
whose prejudices had long been documented.21 Still, the Ford Foun-
dation then-and to this day-took great pains to emphasize its
non-profit independence from the Motor Company, its humanitar-
ian mission, and its sole desire to "strengthen democratic values,
reduce poverty and injustice, promote international cooperation,
[and] advance human achievement."2 2 Today it cites its "nearly $16
billion in grants distributed worldwide" 23 as central evidence of its
commitment to its mandate.
In terms of its specific work relating to Africa and legal education,
the archival documents suggest that the planning for engaging the
continent began soon after Ghana gained its independence from
Britain in 1957. The Ghanaian government approached Ford and
proposed establishing a law school "scheme for the training of lawyers
with qualifications suitable for conditions in Ghana today."2 4 The
20 Interview with Francis Sutton, an expert on American philanthropy and a high-
ranking and long-time official at the Ford Foundation who, as will be discussed,
played an instrumental role in the SAILER project (Sept. 27, 2010). For a key his-
torical overview of American philanthropy, see Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy, and
Social Class: Variance Power and the Battle for American Giving, 26 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1145 (2003).
21 For a selected sample of works discussing Fords anti-Semitism, see NEIL BALD-
WIN, HENRY FORD AND THE JEWS: THE MASS PRODUCTION OF HATE (2001); DOUGLAS BRINKLEY,
WHEELS FOR THE WORLD: HENRY FORD, His COMPANY, AND A CENTURY OF PROGRESS, 1903-2003
(2003); MAX WALLACE, THE AMERICAN Axis:.HENRY FORD, CHARLES LINDBERGH, AND THE RISE
OF THE THIRD REICH (2003). See also Victoria Saker Woeste, Suing Henry Ford: Amer-
ica's First Hate Speech Case, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, http://www.americanbar
foundation.org/research/project/19 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
22 See Mission Statement, FORD FOUNDATION, http://www.fordfound.org/about-us/
mission (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
23 See About Us, FORD FOUNDATION, http://www.fordfoundation.org/About-Us (last
visited Nov. 18, 2011).
24 PROPOSAL FROM THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, GHANA, TO THE FORD FOUNDATION, PROVISION
OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN GHANA, 2 (Feb. 12, 1958.) Note, on page 7 of this document it
states that the law school would be set to open in November 1957; however,
reaction by Ford was circumspect. The main Ford policymakers dis-
cussing this initiative via cables and memorandums included H.C.L.
(Chris) Merillat, a long time Ford-India policymaker who was brought
in to advise on the Ghana question. There was also Francis (Frank)
X. Sutton, a sociologist with a Ph.D. from Harvard, who was serving
as Ford's program associate for the Middle East and Africa. Over-
seeing the discussion was John Howard, the director of Ford's Inter-
national Training and Research Program, who was another Harvard
Ph.D. (albeit in chemistry), and who was also a lawyer with a J.D.
from the University of Chicago.
In the summer of 1958, Howard dispatched Merillat first to
Britain and then to Ghana to meet with a number of lawyers and
scholars who were familiar with the Ghanaian legal education land-
scape.25 In London, Merillat met with A.N. Allott, who "[m]ore than
any other English scholar ... [had] worked seriously on native cus-
tomary law in Ghana and elsewhere in Africa."2 6 Prior to the meet-
ing, Allott had written to Merillat. Allott revealed his skepticism
towards the Ghanaian government's plan. For one thing, it did not
set out methods for developing three types of lawyers that inde-
pendent Ghana needed: "(a) business lawyers, i.e., solicitors, of
Ghanaian origin, (b) Ghanaian lawyers in central and local govern-
ment . . [and] (c) lawyers to staff the present superior and magis-
trates' courts, and the proposed local courts which will replace the
existing native courts."2 7 For Allott, the proposed Ghanaian scheme
was ad hoc and piecemeal in nature, and it did not address two
additional concerns: how the government planned to tackle corrup-
subsequent documents show that the opening would be in fact set for November
of 1958. See e.g., Memorandum, H.C.L. Merillat, Legal Education in Ghana (Aug.
15, 1958) [hereinafter Merillat, Legal Education] (on file with author) (noting that
"the school will get underway this fall, probably in November").
2 See Letter from H.C.L. Merillat to A.N. Allott, School of Oriental and African
Studies, informing the latter of his plans (June 16, 1958) (on file with author).
26 See Merillat, Legal Education, supro note 24. Note Allott founded the African
law department at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London. Other
early members of the faculty included: a South African expatriate, Neville Rubin,
Eugene Cotran, who authored restatement-type works on Kenya, Henry Morris, a
bureaucrat who had worked in Uganda, and James Read. Author correspondence
with Professor Richard Abel (Aug. 16, 2011).
27 See Letter from A.N. Allott to H.C.L. Merillat 1 (June 27, 1958) (on file with
author).
tion in the judiciary and legal profession; and how legal education
would substantively equip the next generation of lawyers with the
necessary skills to be leaders within this newly independent country.2 8
Notwithstanding Allott's opposition,29 Merillat met with support-
ers of the initiative in the United Kingdom, including twice with
Ghanaian Attorney General Geoffrey Bing, Dr. R.H. Stoughton-who
was to be the founding Principal at the proposed University College
(UC) of Ghana, and J.H.A. Lang who had been tapped to serve on
both the UC law faculty and as director of Ghanaian legal education.'o
(The UC was to be the American equivalent of an undergraduate
institution with a program in law.) In Ghana, Merillat encountered
several lawyers and judges, the most prominent being Chief Justice
Arku Korsah. Both Ghanaian and English-educated, Korsah also served
as head of the UC project.3 1 Bing, Stoughton, Lang, and Korsah all
sought Ford funding and wanted a Ford-sponsored American law
professor who could serve as a visitor on the UC faculty.32 As Mer-
illat reported back to New York, he ultimately concluded that Ford
"ought not to support directly the new 'Temporary' Scheme for
rapid training of lawyers,"3  although he recommended that Ford
fund an American professor to serve as a UC visitor. The visitor's
focus would be on "the longer-run development of legal education
and professional standards," 3 4 including an emphasis on research
and pedagogy.
28 Id. at 2.
29 See Merillat, Legal Education, supra note 24.
30 id. at 3-4.
31 Id. Korsah, in subsequent years, gained international acclaim as he presided
over the famous Kulungugu trial. (He was concurrently serving as Ghana's Chief
Justice). In this case, five defendants were charged with the attempted assassina-
tion of President Kwame Nkrumah. Two were found guilty, but Korsah acquitted
the remaining three on lack of evidence. The verdict so outraged Nkrumah that
the president ousted Korsah from his post as Chief Justice. See infra text accom-
panying note 214.
32 See Merillat, Legal Education, supra note 24, at 3-4.
13 Id. at 1 (emphasis in original). Note this quote is also found in an evaluation
of SAILER by Robert Listenbee, see source cited infra note 291 at 9, who wrote
two reports for Ford in 1977. Listenbee's evaluations are discussed in detail in the
conclusion of this paper.
34 See Merillat, Legal Education, supra note 24, at 3-4. It is also worthwhile to
note that in addition to the people Merillat met in London and Ghana, a letter from
him back to Ford, dated August 16, 1958, also states that in England he had ap-
Merillat's in-depth reporting of the situation in Ghana to Ford did
not dampen the spirits of those within the office who still sought
to work in Africa. Frank Sutton was one such Ford official, who
wanted to investigate the possibilities. Before coming to Ford in
1954, Sutton had been an Assistant Professor of Sociology and Gen-
eral Education at Harvard." At Ford, he was assigned to the Social
and Behavioral Sciences wing but then was transferred to Africa,
where he lived during much of the latter half of the 1950s.16 This
experience shaped his world-view that the only way for democracy
to take hold was if education was at the forefront of development
efforts-including legal education. In September of 1958, Sutton
wrote to Harvard Law School Dean, Erwin Griswold, to see what
Griswold thought about pursuing legal education projects in Ghana.
Conceding that he knew little about this subject except from what
he had "learned from Mr. [J.H.A.] Lang and Professor L.C.B. Gower
in London"" a month before, Griswold nevertheless determined
that "developing an appropriate program of legal education in
Ghana would not be easy.""'
Despite not receiving the support it had wanted from Ford, the
Ghana government proceeded to open the UC (with a law faculty)
and subsequently established the Ghana Law School in Accra in Jan-
uary of 1959.19 (The Ghana Law School was to train UC graduates
to pass the necessary professional examinations to become mem-
pointments with: Members of Parliament: Dingle Foot and Desmond Donnelly,
Time Magazine reporter, Honor Balfour, Professor Jim Gower from the University
of London, Mark Allen, a Commonwealth Relations Officer, Sir Ralph Hone, and
David Williams, Editor of a series of West African publications. In Ghana, Merillat
also met R.J.H. Pogucki (Lands Commissioner), F.H. Battcock (staff member of the
Ghana Attorney General's Office), Mr. Rouse-Jones (government legal advisor), a
Mr. Stainton (legislative aide), a Mr. Taylor (Secretary to Development Commission
and to Standing Committee on Development), members of the Ghana Bar Associ-
ation, and Peter and William Barry (both of the U.S. Embassy).
35 Interview With Francis Sutton (Dec. 7, 2010); see Ford Foundation Biography
Sheet on Francis X. Sutton (on file with author).
36 Id. at both cites.
37 See Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Francis X. Sutton (Sept. 18, 1958) (on file
with author).
38 Id.
- See Ghana School of Law, Excerpt from THE WEST AFRICAN PRESS URVEY (an. 13,
1959) (on file with author). Note J.H.A. Lang was both head of the UC and of the
Ghana School of Law.
bers of the bar.) Believing that any future involvement by Ford in
Ghana (and Africa widely) would depend upon receiving the impri-
matur of academic experts, Sutton traveled to Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts on January 28, 1959 to visit with the constitutional law
scholar Arthur Sutherland. 4 0 There, Sutton explained his vision of
wanting Ford to be involved in African legal education, and in par-
ticular, how he thought that a strong system of federalism, if incor-
porated, could serve African states well, especially with respect to
the task of imparting legal education.41 According to the records,
Sutherland appeared quite supportive and encouraging of this idea. 42
Still, Frank Sutton was a realist. As he stated in memos some years
later, and then in two interviews in 2010, in the back of his mind he
constantly worried about the prospects of democracy in Africa and
the wisdom of trying to implement Western-American-based legal
norms and legal education in this region. 43 Yet at the same time he
was torn. He believed, especially given the number of sophisticated
and learned Africans with whom he dealt, that there was a real de-
sire among these educators and policymakers for reforming, mod-
ernizing, and stabilizing the rule of law.4 4 Therefore, proceeding as
many intellectuals often do when they are conflicted, Sutton de-
cided he and Ford needed to do more studying and deliberating on
what steps to take next. The eventual result was the birth of SAILER.
B. The Creation of the Program
Another key Ford player in the 1950s who was examining the de-
velopments from on the ground-this time in Lagos-was J. Donald
Kingsley. Like John Howard, Kingsley was a lawyer and Ph.D. (from
Syracuse's well-regarded Maxwell School). He had held a teaching
post at Antioch College and thereafter served in the federal gov-
40 See Memorandum, Francis X. Sutton, Visit with Professor Arthur Sutherland,
Harvard Law School (Jan. 28, 1959, dated Jan. 29, 1959) (on file with author).
41 Id.; interview with Francis Sutton (Dec. 7, 2010). Follow-up written correspon-
dence with Sutton (Dec. 15, 2010).
42 See Sutton, supra note 40.
43 Interview with Francis Sutton (Dec. 7, 2010); interview (Sept. 27, 2010); see
also Francis X. Sutton, Memo to the Files (62-293) (Aug. 29, 1977).
44 See sources cited supra note 43. See also Francis X. Sutton, SAILER: A Retro-
spect in Changed Times, A Conference of Law Teachers Who Worked in Africa 20-
24 (Sept. 26-27, 1986) (on file with author).
ernment and at the United Nations on a combination of infrastruc-
ture and educational projects.45 Kingsley came to Ford in 1958 and
by the late summer of 1960, while in Nigeria, he was drafting a
memo about how best to support "teacher training" 46 and a "Na-
tional Library" 47 in the country. Kingsley's report, Sutton's continued
interest, and Howard's leadership position prompted the three to
conceive of two major conferences: the first in Lagos in January of
1961 followed by one at Yale Law School three months later.
The Lagos conference was a jointly-funded effort by Ford and the
Nigerian government.48 The conference was also sponsored by the
International Commission of Jurists, a non-partisan group of lawyers
and judges that promoted (and continues to do so) the "implemen-
tation of international law and principles that advance human
rights." 49 There were several objectives to the meeting that included
devising ways: to strengthen the legal profession and the judiciary
in Africa; to bridge-build among lawyers within various parts of
Africa; and to collaborate professionally with legal practitioners
from the international community.s0
Laurence M. Lombard, a Boston lawyer (who would later go on
to serve as director of Dow Jones & Company"), attended the con-
ference and documented the proceedings for the American Bar
Association (ABA) Journal. The vast majority of the 194 participants
were from Africa,52 but Lombard's account reveals how dignitaries
45 See Ford Biography Sheet on J. Donald Kingsley (on file with author).
46 See Ford Foundation Memo from J. Donald Kingsley, Lagos 16 (Aug. 22, 1960)
(on file with author).
47 Id.
48 See Laurence M. Lombard, African Conference on the Rule of Law Held at
Lagos, Nigeria, in January, 47 A.B.A. J. 563 (1961) (noting that Ford contributed
$54,000 to the venture and the Nigerians added 10,000 pounds).
49 See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTs (ICJ), http://www.icj.org/default.asp?
nodelD=441&langage=1&myPage=Overview (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
so See Promotional Material, International Commission of Jurists (Dec. 21, 1960),
http://www.icj.org/default.asp?nodel D=349&sesslD=138345226@21214758164
&Iangage=1&myPage=LegalDocumentation&id=23403.
s1 For a rather sloppily titled obituary, see Obituary: Lawrence (sic) M. Lomardo
(sic), N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/09/01/us/lawrence-
m-lomardo.html.
52 See Lombard, supra note 48, at 563.
from around the world were also present.s3 From the United States,
there was an array of attendees, ranging from Professors Robert
Bowie (Harvard), Thomas Frank (NYU), Fowler Harper (Yale), William
Burnett Harvey (Michigan), Louis Schwartz and James C.N. Paul
(both from the University of Pennsylvania), New York lawyer Eli
Whitney Debevoise, Third Circuit Judge William Hastie, and ABA
official Charles Rhyne.5 4 According to Lombard, the three-day con-
ference was divided into three concurrently held plenary sessions
where, because of his status, he "was free to move from one com-
mittee to another,"ss which allowed him to witness "when particu-
larly controversial points were being discussed."' 6 The subject matter
of the three sessions focused on, respectively, the scope and limi-
tations of government-power, the intersection of criminal law and
human rights, and how lawyers and judges could best protect indi-
vidual freedoms." As Lombard observed, these discussions occurred
against the backdrop of the on-going racial.discrimination in the
southern part of Africa (Southern Rhodesia and South Africa) and
the continued colonial rule in other parts of the continent.' Not
surprisingly, when such issues arose, so did considerable tension.
But overall Lombard's report indicates that the meeting was "a great
success," 9 with a prevailing intimation being that for legal progress
to occur in Africa, democratic values had to be imparted within ed-
ucational institutions.
The ensuing April 1961 Yale meeting (which was purposely much
smaller) picked-up on this idea by bringing together scholars from
universities that had faculty interest in Africa, including Columbia,
1 These included, for example, from Britain: Sir Patrick Devlin, Norman Marsh,
and Gerald Gardiner; from India: ICJ President Vivian Bose (who was also a former
Justice on the Supreme Court of India); as well as representatives from France,
Canada, Denmark, and Germany. Id. at 563-64.
54 Id. at 564. Note Lombard does not make mention of James Paul, but Paul's
own account does. See James C.N. Paul, Seeking the Rule of Low in Africa, 10 ExPE-
RIENcE 21 (2000) (noting that "[a] trip to Lagos, Nigeria to attend a lavish interna-
tional conference on the future of the "Rule of Law in Africa" helped to ignite ...(his] interest" in the continent. See id. at 21).
* Lombard, supro note 48, at 564.
56 Id.
7 id.
5 Id. at 565-67.
5 Id. at 567.
MIT, Pennsylvania, Rutgers, Syracuse, and Yale. There were also rep-
resentatives from Britain (including A.N. Allott), Nigeria, East Africa,
and the U.S. State Department. 60 Following, in particular, Sutton's
desire to learn by having advisors with different perspectives de-
bate, the plan was to arrive at a strategy for how Ford might sub-
stantively and productively support legal education in this region.61
From Yale's end, two individuals-Assistant Dean Charles Runyon
and an assistant professor from Britain, Robert B. Stevens -were in
charge of moderating the seminar.62 The first order of business
involved determining in what countries Ford should play a role. A
decision was reached that Ghana, given its preexisting connections
with Ford, would remain of focus.63 In addition, because of interest
from respective African leaders, Ford would explore ways to assist
Nigeria, SierraLeone, the Central African Federation, and countries
in East Africa.64 As Runyon and Stevens describe, the Yale confer-
ence resulted in recommendations that Ford proceed along several
interrelated lines. For example, there was the strongly-held view
that American educators simply needed to know more about Africa.
As Ruynon and Stevens rightly noted, "the greatest handicap to
effective American participation in the development of African legal
education has been the absence of any accurate knowledge of"65
Africa. For this reason, they urged Ford to financially support Amer-
ican scholars for extended, in-depth visits in order to gain greater




63 Charles Ruynon & Robert Stevens, Memorandum on Legal Education in Africa
(on file with author) There is no date on this document, but there is a date of May
2, 1961 in a cover letter from Stevens to Cliff Thompson, who too was at the Ford
Foundation and would eventually go on to work extensively in Sudan, Ethiopia,
and Zambia. Thompson, among his many other accomplishments, would serve as
dean at several different U.S. law schools, including Wisconsin, Hawaii, Idaho, and
Michigan State. He was also the third and final American dean of the Haile Selassie
University in Addis Ababa, and he was a faculty member at the University of Zam-
bia. See, Cliff Thompson Bio, UNIVERSITY OF WIscoNsIN LAw ScHooL, http://law.wisc.
edu/profiles/cfthomps@wisc.edu (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
6 See Runyon & Stevens, supra note 63, at 4 (noting also East Africa, at this time,
was divided into Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika. In terms of education, a technical
college was present in Nairobi, and a law faculty was planned for Dar es Salaam).
65 Id.
"information and understanding about the problems of legal edu-
cation in Africa." 66
There were other recommendations as well. Through the estab-
lishment of fellowships, Ford could become more involved with
American law school efforts to recruit African students, particularly
from Anglo-phonic countries." Plus, although Runyon and Stevens
recognized that "[t]he time for any American university to act as
[an] adviser for an African one is somewhat premature," 68 hope
existed for the time when Ford could serve as an eventual conduit.
Indeed, in 1960 the prominent scholar Max Rheinstein, from the
University of Chicago, traveled on behalf of the Carnegie Corpora-
tion to several African law schools and had made a similar observa-
tion about the possibility of burgeoning American-African
partnerships in the future.69 Finally, Ford could assist by providing
much needed funding-opportunities for experts in African law-"a
field which ha[d] been totally neglected until now" 70 -to teach such
courses at law schools in the United States.
From the Lagos and Yale conferences, great energy ensued. One
person who was present at both meetings was James C.N. Paul, a
thirty-five year old law professor at the University of Pennsylvania,
who would become a seminal figure in the SAILER progran.7 Paul
and Runyon struck up a friendship, and during the summer of 1961
Runyon was able to secure funding for Paul from the Eisenhower
Exchange Fellowship Program to travel to ten African countries over
a six week period.7 2 A careful scholar who disdained "inside reports
written by people who ... visit a place for only a few days and then
write knowingly,"73 Paul was nonetheless commissioned to explore
the status of legal education in mainly Anglo-phonic West and East
66 Id. at 5.
6 Id. at 5-6.
ss Id. at 6.
6 Id. at 5-7.
0 Id. at 8.
71 See Paul, supra note 54; Minutes of African Law Meeting, supra note 60.
72 See Paul, supra note 54 at 21-22; see also James C.N. Paul, Memorandum:
Developments in Legal Education in English Speaking Countries in West and East
Africa (Aug. 1961) (on file with author).
7 See Paul, Memorandum: Developments in Legal Education, supra note 72, at
Preface.
Africa and comment on what interested Americans could do to
assist there.74
As he learned from his interactions with lawyers, judges, policy-
makers and academics, although each country had its own unique
culture, history and traditions, there were common legal educa-
tional needs that had not been met by the colonial administrators.
Paul was told that the next generation of African lawyers required
training in private, commercial, transactional law. The education of
future African lawyers, he repeatedly heard, also had to move away
from the colonial approach of "doctrinal-and didactic-methods""
and embrace instead a more comprehensive law-and-public policy
approach.
Paul returned to the United States ecstatic. He drafted a memo
that outlined a model in which American legal educators'could as-
sist African law schools by employing the very best practices from
the United States while remaining sensitive to the nuances of local,
customary law and traditions that permeated each of the targeted
countries.76 It was an ambitious plan, even one filled with great
hubris-a concession Paul made four decades later.77
But Paul's conception of American involvement in Africa, ver-
sus, for example, how Ford was running its India legal education
program at this same time, was qualitatively different and certainly
more subtle. The main difference, of course, was that Paul proposed
having Americans immersed in Africa, learning about the different
societies, and serving not just as teachers but as students of their
new environments. Runyon and Paul presented the latter's findings
and proposal to Ford in the fall of 1961, and soon thereafter, Sutton,
Howard, and other leaders in the Foundation decided to use it as
the template for initiating a project that would be called Staffing of
African Institutions of Legal Education and Research-SAILER.78
1 As Paul describes, he "traveled to Senegal [a Franco-phone country], Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Ghana, Nigeria, and across the continent to Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia,
and East Africa." See Paul, supra note 54, at 22.
7s Id. at 23.
76 See Paul, Memorandum: Developments in Legal Education, supra note 72.
7 See Paul, supra note 54, at 23 (noting how "[Ihooking back, I am somewhat
ashamed of the arrogance that infected my enthusiasm. But by 1961 Africa had
been 'discovered' by intellectuals, politicians and aid-givers; optimism overshad-
owed realism, and instant expertise was widely practiced.").
78 Id.
The next step was that Ford needed someone to implement the
blueprint-to operationalize in practice what had been developed
on paper. In 1962, Ford hired John S. Bainbridge, an assistant dean
from Columbia Law School, to head SAILER.79 A graduate of Harvard
College and Columbia Law, Bainbridge served in World War Iland
then as a private lawyer until 1956.0 For the next six years, Bain-
bridge worked at Columbia on international programs until he was
brought on by Ford in 1962.1 The following section details how
Bainbridge devoted over a decade of his professional life to SAILER
and the effects of his work on legal education in Africa.
II. IMPLEMENTING SAILER
A. Moving Concretely to an Agenda
John Bainbridge never saw himself as a prolific scholar or an
abstract theoretician. At Columbia his success came from being a
practical administrator, someone who conceived of law as an
action-oriented instrument, particularly as it related to exposing
students, faculty, and staff to the changing international landscape.
He was also an individual whose passion came from working with
people who wanted to make their lives better; and he brought this
attitude to SAILER. To Bainbridge's detractors, though, his ambition
smacked of imperialist arrogance; in fact, one of his biggest critics
was within Ford itself, John Spencer, a program officer, who deri-
sively referred to him as "Cecil" (as in Cecil Rhodes) and lampooned
him as "one of the few empire builders left in the world." 82
9 See David Brownwood, John S. Bainbridge, 1915-2006 (Feb. 26, 2006) (per-
sonal letter on file with author).
80 See Wolfgang Saxon, John S. Bainbridge, 90, Legal Educator for African Leaders,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2006) http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/06/nyregion/06bain
bridge.html.
81 Id.
"I See Memorandum from John Spencer to Francis X. Sutton, SAILER in Africa
(Oct. 27, 1965) (on file with author). In a separate memo two months later to J.
Donald Kingsley, Spencer once again critiques Bainbridge as "a long, rambling"
speaker who thought about dropping SAILER from his portfolio as early as Decem-
ber 1965 so that he (Bainbridge) could "concentrate on providing legal advice to
the President of Columbia"-another venture that Spencer saw as dilettante-
esque by Bainbridge. See Memo from John Spencer to J. Donald Kingsley, [Subject:
John Bainbridge] (Dec. 29, 1965) (on file with author).
But to others who knew and worked intimately with Bainbridge,
this was an unfair charge. As they stated, his main goal was to
determine how best to deliver legal education to those who so re-
quested, in an economically, pedagogically and culturally sensitive
fashion. No documented evidence has been found to suggest that
Bainbridge ever used SAILER to further American expansionism or
American foreign policy goals. From the start, and then throughout
the life of SAILER, supporters of Bainbridge noted that he repeatedly
incorporated different points of views from different parts of the
world, most importantly from Africa. As evidence, in January of
1962, Bainbridge helped to organize another conference, this time
in Accra, Ghana, where he invited mainly Africans to discuss how
best to begin the implementation of SAILER.8
The Africans, along with the American and British representatives
who were present, concluded that because the latter was having
difficulty filling teaching posts at their own law colleges in the
United Kingdom, let alone enticing enough Britons to venture into
the African legal academy, the Americans should be the primary for-
eign staff working on the continent with their counterparts. 84 Upon
the conclusion of the Ghana meeting, a follow-up session with sev-
eral of these same participants occurred in March of 1962 at Ford
headquarters in New York City.85 Here the agenda included finalizing
the decision to have Ford fund a group of American lawyers who
would spend extended periods of time as members of African law
faculties.86
8 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 3. From the conference
program, sixteen African countries were listed as having sixty-three representa-
tives; the United States had eight representatives, Britain had three, New Zealand
had one, and UNESCO had one. (Bainbridge notes though that it was "believed
that not everyone listed attended the conference." BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at
174.).
84See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 4.
8 Id. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 174-77 for a list of participants.
86 Interestingly, a parallel project administered by the U.S. government was in
its formative stages at this time as well. President John Kennedy's Peace Corps
program was seeking to recruit lawyers who would travel to Africa and work in
the same fashion as Ford's proposed initiative. At the behest of Harris Wofford,
the deputy-director of the Peace Corps, James Paul returned to many of the African
countries he had previously visited, but this time to explore how receptive local
officials would be towards hosting U.S. government-funded lawyers. He later doc-
umented how he "was pleasantly surprised to become aware of numerous re-
quests for volunteers to staff [a variety of different] positions .... " These included
In June of 1962, Ford made its first official grant to fund SAILER
in the amount of $238,000.87 The grant was for a two-year term that
could be renewed depending on the progress of the program.88
Bainbridge was formally named as director of SAILER.89 Ford had
sponsored past initiatives on Africa; in 1960, it had provided a
$106,000 grant to the University of Khartoum to study the history
of Sudanese law.90 It was funding two separate American university
programs, one at MIT and the other at Syracuse, which involved
sending Americans to Africa to work in positions of public adminis-
tration as well as law teaching.9' But the SAILER grant was the
widest in scope and most penetrating in terms of purpose. The ob-
jective was two-fold: to strengthen already existing law schools in
countries like Ghana, Zaire, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, as well as in
the Francophone country of Senegal; and to establish sound legal
educational institutions in places where there was "scarcely the be-
ginning of a professional group of African lawyers."92
The strategy for implementing SAILER was straightforward and
came in three parts. First, there would be support for senior Amer-
ican legal scholars to travel and spend time on law faculties in Africa.
These academics would work with Africans interested in develop-
working as academics, drafters on legislation, and as assistants on customary law
projects. See Paul, supra note 54, at 23.
* See Ford Foundation, Program Action Memo (May 25, 1962); see a/so Bain-
bridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 4.
8 See id. at both cites.
89 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9,, at 5.
9o See Request for Grant Action, Ford Foundation Memo 1 (Apr. 27, 1962) (on
file with author).
9' Id.; see also Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 87 (noting how in
Nigeria, at Ahmadu Bello University, "[aible expatriate teachers, not only from
SAILER but from both Syracuse and MIT programs, have established the law faculty
as a center of vigorous, independent scholarship.").
92 See Request for Grant Action, supra note 90 at 2. For an important scholar
who has written on the Francophone law-and-developments in Africa, see JESWALD
W. SALACUSE, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW IN FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICA 1-II (1975) (note SALACUSE
also served as an advisor to Ford and as an Associate Director for the African Law
Center. For information on the ALC, see infra note 185. He also was involved in
shaping the law faculties in the Sudan, Nigeria, and Zaire; see Jeswald Salacuse
Bio, TUFTS UNIVERSITY: THE FLETCHER SCHOOL, http://fletcher.tufts.edu/Fletcher-Direc
tory/Find-Fletcher-People/Faculty%20Profile?personkey=A4AO9414-C9B2-46AC-
A926-2FF762BA71CA (last visited Nov. 18, 2011)).
ing their research, writing, and scholarship skills.93 Second, SAILER
would offer opportunities for "junior Americans" 9 4 -recent, "first-
class graduates of the best American law schools"9 5-to serve as
teaching fellows on African law faculties for up to two years. The
idea here was that by having instructors who were closer in age to
both the African students and the younger African faculty, the "ju-
nior Americans" might more easily relate to these colleagues, which
in turn might spawn deeper professional relationships beyond the
two-year visitor-ship. Third, for certain African law schools, the lead-
ership of these institutions would be comprised of academics from
the West who would be supported by SAILER-funding.96
Curiously, in none of the Ford papers was there serious mention
of how problematic this SAILER-plan might be. There are likely two
explanations for such an omission. One is that there was indeed "ar-
rogance"97 among the SAILER designers, especially among those
caught up in the "nationalistic view that first-rate young lawyers
from the U.S. could well prove their worth to many new govern-
ments in Africa."98 The Americans thus did not view themselves as
anything but cooperative colleagues in what they perceived to be a
noble cause. The other reason was that the Americans were prima-
rily in contact with African leaders and educational officials who
were sympathetic to the objectives of SAILER. Recall that Ford de-
liberately engaged only those African states that reached out to it
for legal educational assistance. The story of James Paul's inaugural
decanal appointment lends support for this position. As he noted
in his reflections on SAILER:
Late in 1962, when I was working in my law school office at Penn, the phone
rang, and after a lot of operator chatter I was connected with the Imperial
Palace in Addis Ababa. My Ethiopian caller identified himself as the newly
93 Request for Grant Action, supra note 90, at 2-3.
9" Id. at 3.
9 Id.
96 For example, at the Institute of Public Administration in Mpemba, Malawi,
"an American law graduate [Vern Davidson was] ... in charge of the professional
law training program." See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 78. Sim-
ilarly, James Beardsley led the law faculty at the University of Botswana, Lesotho,
and Swaziland. Id. at 72; id. at 72 tbl.1. This point will be discussed in further detail
when looking at the three case studies.
97 See Paul, supra note 54, at 23.
98 Id.
appointed president of the newly created Haile Selassie University. He said
to me, "I am standing in the presence of His Imperial Majesty who com-
mands-I mean requests-I mean invites-you to come to Ethiopia to start
a law school in His new university as its first dean. Will you come?" 99
Perhaps then, from the SAILER leadership's perspective, there
was the assumption that the wishes of governmental and educa-
tional leaders reflected a wider consensus among the respective
constituencies. If this were the case, there would have been little
reason to anticipate resentment or backlash; however, as will be
seen soon, in some instances such hostility boiled to the surface.
Additionally, there was the belief among SAILER officials and African
educational leaders (like those in attendance at the Accra confer-
ence) that a new approach towards legal education needed to be
embraced. John A. Harrington and Ambreena Manji have uncov-
ered how Lord Denning, one of Britain's most famous experts on
legal education, advocated reforms in the 1950s and early 1960s
for Africa that were traditional and conservative.100 As Harrington
and Manji describe, L.C.B. Gower-a Briton himself-was particu-
larly opposed to Denning's position that African lawyers needed to
be trained in the English vein where technical, practice-oriented
skills were emphasized above all else.101 In contrast, for Gower and
the other SAILER advocates, legal education had to include a
breadth of courses where law and "non-law subjects [were] to be
taught to degree students."102 In other words, as will be discussed
9 Id. at 23-24.
1oo See John A. Harrington & Ambreena Manji, Mind with Mind and Spirit with
Spirit: Lord Denning andAfrican Legal Education, 30 J.L. & Soc'Y 376 (2003). For a
classic piece on the differences between English and American legal education,
see John H. Merryman, Legal Education Here and There: A Comparison, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 859 (1975); see also Andrew Boon & Julian Webb, Legal Education and Train-
ing in England and Wales: Back to the Future? 58 J. LEGAL EDUCATION 79 (2008) (citing
also Merryman at 79).
101 Harrington & Manji, supra note 100, at 377-78, 383-84. Note, the authors do
not discuss SAILER in particular but do mention the Ford Foundation and how the
Americans had extensive, "superior resources"-much more than the Brits-to
substantially impact legal education in Africa. See id. at 382.
102 Id. at 386. Two other prominent British academics who felt similarly to Gower
were Professors Michael Zander and Geoffrey Bindman. In addition, the Committee
on Legal Education in the United Kingdom, chaired by Lord Roger Ormrod, issued
a report in 1971 that highlighted a number of suggestions for revamping British
legal education. Such a move had been argued for by the likes of William Twining;
next, autonomy from the bar, a liberal law and public policy curricu-
lum, and academic entrepreneurialism-all anathemas to Den-
ning-were promoted as the proper foundation for the new African
law school model.10 3
B. Beginning the Real Work
By the time SAILER began its substantive tasks, towards the end
of 1962, the British had all but conceded their diminishing influence
over the future of African legal education.104 The Americans had
more money, and interest in African academia in Britain was com-
paratively less than in the United States. 0 Britons still maintained
some presence on various African law faculties. 0 6 But the SAILER
program had the greater presence throughout the 1960s. Consider
Table 1, which provides three key points of information: the coun-
tries and institutions within them that hosted SAILER-teachers; the
participants themselves; and the amount of funding allocated to
these individuals during their first assignments in Africa. Several of
these participants continued to stay on for subsequent assignments,
with SAILER-support. (And note, while almost all of these individuals
were Americans, a few were not.)
see William Twining, Pericles and the Plumber, 83 L.Q. REV. 396 (1967). See Boon
& Webb, supra note 100, at 89-93. See also author correspondence with Professor
Richard Abel (Aug. 16, 2011).
. 103 Harrington & Manji, supra note 100, at 383-86. Note, in this article, the au-
thors discuss how the British saw the American efforts on legal education to be
part of a larger geopolitical method to combat Soviet influence in the region. This
viewpoint, as will be discussed later, is one that was also shared by those Africans
who opposed Ford's plans. However, nowhere is there evidence in the Ford doc-
uments that such motivation is what drove the SAILER-leadership.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 382.
106 In particular, consider the famous legal theorist, William Twining, who was
born in Uganda, spent time teaching in Khartoum and then Dar-es-Salaam be-
tween 1958 and 1965. See Raymundo Gama (Alicante), Interview with William
Twining 1 (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/academics/profiles/twin-
ing/ALICANTEINTERVIEW1OJan2O1O.pdf (although as Twining himself notes, in
terms of academic research and publications, he has "not written much about this
[i.e., legal education in Africa], although it remains an important part of .. . [his]
background." Id. at 1.
TABLE 1107
SAILER Expenditures and Commitments during the Early Years
Staffing by Countries Money Committed
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*Not included: Inez Smith who worked at EDNA in Congo and Allen Farnsworth and John
M. Hazard, who worked in Senegal. According to the SAILER documents, no SAILER funding
was allocated to them.
In 1967, John Bainbridge completed a five year assessment of
SAILER for Ford and the Institute of International Education (IE).
Logistically, the lE housed the money Ford issued for SAILER. Cre-
ated in 1919, the IIE had earned a strong reputation as an efficient
administrator for non-profit programs that wished to work
abroad; 108 for this reason Ford opted to outsource the day-to-day
financial operations of SAILER to the IIE. There was a two-pronged
approach that SAILER employed during this initial period. For certain
countries, there was what one respondent referred to as an experi-
107 Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 29-32.
' For background on the IIE, see INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, http://
www.iie.org (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
mental, "testing the waters with your toes"109 strategy. For other
countries, there was a deeper, more sustained, and fuller-fledged
commitment, with respect to dollars spent and staff sent." 0
In terms of the former, those countries included: Congo, Kenya,
Lesotho, Malawi, and Zambia. The reasons for moving more cau-
tiously varied depending upon the setting. For example, in Kenya,
legal education during the 1960s underwent major changes. The
University of Nairobi-Faculty of Law only opened in 1970. Prior to
that, from 1963-1970, interested students studied at the Kenya
School of Law, which was a five year program that combined two
years of academic courses with three years of articling.111 However,
before 1963, for students seeking a career at the bar, training mainly
occurred in Britain." 2 The other higher educational center was the
Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA). KIA was established in 1961,
and while geared towards training civil servants, it offered a series
of law courses, for which SAILER initially supported one instructor,
Philip Durand, in 1967.11
In Congo, there was internal conflict and great "student un-
rest,"11 4 which dampened hope for in-depth SAILER involvement. In
addition, competition existed between the country's two main ed-
ucational institutions-a school of civil service, the Ecole Nationale
de Droit d'Administration, which already was receiving non-SAILER
financing by Ford, and Lovanium University, which sought to build
a law faculty of its own. With the lingua franca not being English,
combined with the low number of students who pursued law at the
latter,"15 SAILER decided to fund only one teaching line to test
whether remaining involved in Congo made sense.
109 Interview with SAILER-participant (Aug. 24, 2010) (anonymity provided upon
request).
110 Id.
"I See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 236-43. Note the coursework took place in
the first and fifth years. Id. at 242.
112 Id. at 242.
113 Id. at 239-41. For an in-depth examination of the politics of the Kenyan bar,
particularly as it related to the nation-building and constitutional design-making
process, and its interactions with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall,
see MARY DUDZIAK, EXPORTING AMERICAN DREAMS: THURGOOD MARSHALL's AFRICAN JOURNAL
(2008).
114 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, Supro note 9, at 61.
us Even by 1966, there were 2200 students at the university, but only 30 sought
to obtain a law degree. Id.
Likewise, in Malawi, there was simply a dearth of Malawian law
students and lawyers.116 The three teachers funded by SAILER
helped develop law reports, teaching materials, and broad legal
education strategies for the Malawian government. But the infra-
structure and logistics did not make it efficient, in Ford's eyes, to
commit further resources to the country.
A similar assessment explained Bainbridge's decision to only min-
imally support Lesotho."' Enclosed within southern Africa-within
what is today the modern state of South Africa-Lesotho was
steeped in the tradition of Roman Dutch law." 8 Its main university
(the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland) served as a
safe haven and intellectual sanctuary for scholars, students, and in-
terested foreigners to oppose apartheid practices." 9 Yet because of
its poor economy, weak infrastructure, and Ford's perception that
it had little power or influence within Africa, Lesotho received fund-
ing from SAILER for only two academics and little subsequent sup-
port thereafter.120
And in Lusaka, while there was an affirmative decision by the Uni-
versity of Zambia to adopt the American law school method, 2' in-
cluding requiring Zambian law students first to have undergraduate
degrees,'22 revamping the system would take several years to man-
ifest. Therefore, SAILER funded only two teachers to assist initially:
Cliff Thompson, who had worked in Sudan and Thomas Lamia, who
had spent time at the University of Ife in Nigeria.123
116 Id. at 78 (noting: "[a]t the time of independence there was but one Malawi
lawyer").
117 Id. at 72-73.
"2 Id. at 73.
119 To highlight this point, see Alistair Boddy-Evans, Desmond Mpilo Tutu,
ABOUT.coM GUIDE, AFRICAN HIsTORY, http://africanhistory.about.com/od/peopl1/a/
Desmond-Tutu-Biography.htmhttp://africanhistory.about.com/od/peopll/
a/Desmond-Tutu-Biography.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (noting that "[iln 1969
[Desmond] Tutu took a teaching post with the University of Botswana, Lesotho
and Swaziland (UBLS) . . . [which was] slightly insulated from the worst of
Apartheid's excesses .... .
120 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 72-73.
12 Namely, in that this would be "a graduate discipline." Id. at 97.
122 Id. This Was the plan of the Dean, Kwamena Bentsi-Enchill, a Ghanaian who
was Oxford, Chicago, and Harvard educated, and someone whose plans Bainbridge
saw as "visionary". Id.
123 Id.
For Ethiopia, Ghana,Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tanzania, where
SAILER committed comparatively more resources, the decision to
enter these countries also was made on a case-by-case basis. In the
next section, there will be specific focus on what occurred in Ethiopia,
Ghana, and Nigeria. But two underlying reasons existed for why
SAILER dedicated finances and personnel to all of these six states.
First, the political and legal leadership in each, at least initially,
invited, accepted, and even embraced the educational aspirations
of SAILER. The episode involving James Paul and the Ethiopian
Emperor, Haile Selassie, although perhaps most supportive of this
point, reflects a general attitude also exhibited by the Ghanaian,
Liberian, Nigerian, Sudanese, and Tanzanian leadership as well. Of
course, an instrumental and even cynical explanation for these lead-
ers' interest in SAILER may be that there was the sheer desire to
have foreign aid from the United States. After all, if these govern-
ments could avoid spending on legal education, then they could use
this money for other purposes. But this rationale is too simple and
ignores the fact that there was both an interest and perceived need
in having strong legal professionals emerge within these countries
to spur serious economic, legal, and political development. The
other reason for why the SAILER-team opted to participate heavily
in these selected countries was because it was assured that its as-
sistance in research-development would be welcomed, and that the
different governments saw rigorous research as vital for improving
their respective legal systems.
So, for example, beginning in 1960, Ford provided funding for
what became known as the Sudan Law Project. 2 4 The main goal
was for the law faculty at the University of Khartoum to document
and categorize all case law and legal papers from Sudan before the
country gained independence from Britain in 1956.125 In 1963,
SAILER took over the direction of this project and the teachers it
funded worked extensively on this compilation.12 6 The SAILER teach-
124 For general insights, see William L. Twining, Sudan: Legal Studies at the Uni-
versity of Khartoum, J. AFR. STuD. 145 (1962).
125 Id.; see also Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 89. Also, Jeswald
Salacuse was heavily involved in this project as well. See Twenty Years After, A
Conference of Law Teachers Who Worked in Africa 65 (Sept. 26-27, 1986) (papers
from proceedings compiled by John S. Bainbridge, on file with author).
126 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 89.
ers also labored on the Sudan Law Journal and Reports, which or-
ganized judicial rulings following independence.127 In Tanzania, the
SAILER-leadership saw great research potential at the University of
East Africa's law faculty at Dar-es-Salaam. Not only was there an in-
tense desire on the part of the Dar administration to improve the
law library, which impressed Bainbridge and others, but the faculty
itself was a cosmopolitan, global mix. By 1966, there were "8 British
expatriates (including the Dean, an Australian), 7 Africans (including
East Indians in origin though born in East Africa), the 2 SAILER teach-
ers, and 3 other Americans."128 Among this group was a young stel-
lar intellectual, Yash Ghai, who would later rise to dean and proceed
to become one of the most famous comparative law scholars of the
twentieth century.12 9 And in Liberia, at the Louis Arthur Grimes
School of Law, SAILER was encouraged to devise major legal educa-
tion reforms. Admissions standards were raised, the curriculum was
academically strengthened, the law library was enhanced, SAILER-
participants prepared teaching materials, and the Liberian Law Jour-
nal saw its inaugural issue published in 1965.130
In spite of the initial political support of SAILER from these African
leaders, problems nevertheless emerged. In Sudan, for instance,
tension arose as to what role English or Arabic should play in legal
discourse. As Bainbridge and his colleagues discovered, certain Su-
danese political leaders insisted on Arabic being used and Islam
127 Id. Athird research project in which the SAILERteachers participated was the
Sudan Law Reports, which essentially was the compilation of law judgments (taken
from the Sudan Law Project) prior to independence. Id. See also supra note on
Salacuse accompanying note 125.
128 Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 95. Enthusiasm was present
too because American Fulbright scholars were keen on working with SAILER in
Tanzania. Id.
129 Id. at 96. For a further discussion, see infra notes 314-15. Moreover, for a
present-day example of a University of Dar-es-Salaam graduate representing a
global scholarly outlook, see the work of Dean Makau W. Mutua, who earned his
LL.B. and LL.M. from Dar and then proceeded to matriculate from Harvard Law
School with a LL.M. and S.J.D. (He also studied at the University of Nairobi.) For
background on Dean Mutua, see Makau W. Mutua Bio, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO LAW
ScHOOL, http://law.buffalo.edu/FacultyAndStaff/dynamic generalprofile.asp?
faculty=mutuamakau (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); and for a sample of his inter-
national and comparative law work, see MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NGO's IN
EAST AFRICA: POLITICAL AND NORMATIVE TENSIONS (2008); MAKAU MUTUA, KENYA'S QUEST FOR
DEMOCRACY: TAMING LEVIATHAN (2008).
130 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supro note 9, at 74-77.
being incorporated into the legal curriculum."3' By 1966, the Uni-
versity of Khartoum introduced a new three year graduate law pro-
gram (moving away from its previous five year program), requiring
students now to have completed two years of liberal arts education
before pursuing their legal studies.132 Within this new program,
however, there existed an option whereby students could complete
an LL.B. in civil law or, alternatively, one in Sharia law. 33 The gov-
ernment also established a rival institution, the Omdurman Islamic
University and supported another, the University of Cairo-Khartoum
Branch.134 Both these universities emphasized religious law and con-
ducted classes in Arabic, but perhaps more importantly they dis-
played the seriousness under which the government wished to offer
an alternative to secular higher education. Hostility between the
United States and Sudan increased during the mid-1960s. Eventu-
ally, the American government broke off diplomatic ties with Khar-
toum in July of 1967, all but ending SAILER's operations within the
country.13
In Tanzania, the main tensions were internal faculty politics
between the Dean, A.B. Weston, and the Principal of the University
College, R.C. Pratt.'36 Discord also existed between the law faculty
and the bench and bar, with judges and lawyers believing that the
in Id. at 89-94. See also Twining, supra note 124.
132 Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 90-91.
113 In fact, the LL.B. in Sharia law was to be four years. See BAINBRIDGE, supra
note 11, at 311-12.
134 Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 91-93.
13s Id. at 93-94. The SAILER teachers who were expecting to return for that fall
semester had difficulty revalidating their passports from the U.S. State Depart-
ment. Eventually, two of the three SAILER teachers were able to do so, but they
returned to a university that was hostile to them, with a Dean (Zaki Mustafa) who
had proceeded to hire replacements. (The documents also suggest that Dean
Mustafa had grown increasingly resistant to the SAILER methods of legal educa-
tion. While he and Bainbridge remained "most friendly," id. at 94, the Dean faced
political pressure as well as the reality that many of the Khartoum law students
simply had intense difficulty succeeding under the American legal education model
for various reasons. According to Mustafa, the students were not proficient in Eng-
lish; they had been trained under a rote memorization method; and their pre-law
school educational experiences overall were fair to moderate at best. Id. at 92-
94).
136 Id. at 95 (noting that by "1965 Dr. Pratt was succeeded by the registrar of
the university, Dr. Wilbert Chagula, who apparently has proven to be a very able
administrator and principal of the University College.").
academics had become too insular from the practice of law. 137 And
in Liberia an admixture of political and university troubles con-
tributed to a slowing of otherwise positive developments in the
legal education sphere there.138
In the next section, there will be a more detailed focus on three
of the other countries in which SAILER greatly invested: Ethiopia,
Ghana, and Nigeria. In addition to the archival documents from
Ford, the author's fieldwork in these three settings sheds light on
what motivated the SAILER-leadership's interest and how its legal
education initiatives unfolded.
III. THE SAILER EXPERIMENT IN DETAIL: A LOOK AT
THREE DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
A. The Case of Ethiopia
1. The Deanship of James Paul
As home to one of the early cradles of human civilization,
Ethiopia's complex, fascinating, distinct, and at times, tragic history
has been detailed for generations by various scholars.1 9 Discussing
the intricate political, cultural, and socio-economic evolution of
Ethiopia goes beyond the scope of this study. But in terms of mod-
ern legal education, relevant here is that when SAILER began its
project in the early 1960s, Ethiopian law was a mix of customary
traditions, religious norms, feudal regulations, imported continental
' Id. at 96. In large part, according to Bainbridge, this likely was the result of
the law faculty's location being moved outside of Dar to a place called University
Hill.
138 The positives included improvements in the law library, faculty seminars, a
publication of a law journal, and rigorous training of judicial magistrates. Id. at 76-
77. However, according to Bainbridge, the problems were: a lackluster student
body, poor infrastructure, a lack of interest among Liberians to pursue legal aca-
demia, and a very low salary cap on all government officials, including on university
teachers, which contributed to a low interest in government work, especially in
terms of working in public law. Id. at 74-76.
139 See e.g., Herbert Lewis, The Development of Oromo Political Consciousness,
1958-1994, in BEING AND BECOMING ORoMo 37-47 (eds., P. Baxter et al. 1996); HERBERT
LEWIS, JIMMA ABBA JIFAR: AN ORoMo MONARCHY, ETHIOPIA 1830-1932 (2001); HAROLD G.
MARCUs, A HISTORY OF ETHIOPIA (2002); RICHARD PANKHURST, THE ETHIOPIANS: A HISTORY
(2001). For a key piece on the legal pluralism of the day in Ethiopia, see Norman
J. Singer, A Traditional Legal Institution in a Modern Legal Setting: The Atbia Dagnia
of Ethiopia, 18 UCLA L. REV. 308 (1970-71).
codes, and Anglo-American civil and criminal procedural rules.14 0
The Emperor during this time was Haile Selassie I, who had come
to power in 1916.141 An almost mythical-like figure to some in
stature and presence, Haile Selassie was born into an Orthodox
Christian family with roots going back several centuries.142 He also
served as the inspirational savior for those adhering to the Rastafari
movement, and, internationally, he was viewed by many as cosmo-
politan, particularly following a speech at the League of Nations in
1936 where he advocated for a collective response to the use of
force against the Ethiopian people by the Italian military that was
present in Africa.143
For the leaders of SAILER, and in particular James Paul who had
traveled to the country "several times,"14 4 Ethiopia served as the
land of the possible in terms of legal education reform. Despite
Haile Selassie's drawbacks, he was a leader that appeared to em-
brace modernizing the country's legal system.145 In addition, the
government welcomed foreign-specifically American-law profes-
sors to embark on the creation of a new law school that it claimed
would produce the next generation of not just legal, but political,
societal, and nation-building leaders as well. The Ethiopians and
Americans saw the country as an opportunity where law could
be used as an instrument that might close what Roscoe Pound
famously saw as the chasm between "law-in-books and law in
140 See Paul, supra note 54, at 24. See also Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supro
note 9, at 65 (noting at the time how "the penal law is based on Swiss sources with
reference to Yugoslav, Greek and Brazilian sources, the civil and commercial codes
are based on French and German sources, the code of criminal procedure draws
on the Indian code while the constitution of Ethiopia and its public law draw on
Anglo-American sources. Added to this is a strong reference to religious law as
outlined in the Fetha Negast promulgated in the 13th century."). See also Peter
H. Sand, Book Review: Heinrich Scholler, Recht und Politik in Athiopien: Von der
traditionellen Monarchie zum modernen Stoat, 57 AM. J. CoMP. L. 754 (2009).
141 See generally HAROLD G. MARCUS, HAILE SELAISSE: THE FORMATIVE YEARS 1892-1936
(1986).
142 Id.
143 Id. For a text of the speech, see APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS: HAILE SELASSIE
(June 1936) http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/selassie.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2011).
144 See Paul supra note 54, at 24.
145 Id.
action."14 6 For these reasons then, the fit between SAILER's vision
and Haile Selassie's objectives seemed a compatible match.
In September of 1963, the faculty of law at the imperially named
university opened, with James Paul inducted as the first dean. (Note
that about a decade earlier, efforts to launch a Franco-phone law
school in Addis failed to materialize. 147 ) An internal SAILER memo
reveals how enormous a challenge existed for Paul and his inaugural
faculty. Simply put, "there was no law library, no law books, no re-
ports, not the most elemental tool of the lawyers' craft."148 For this
reason, Paul and his colleagues had to start by placing pen-to-paper
and publishing casebooks, law reviews, statutory supplements, and
other academic and legal texts.'149
As daunting as these tasks were, there was also the day-to-day
administration of the LL.B. program. From the outset, the Paul ad-
ministration decided that there would be two methods of enroll-
ment for the law degree. One would be where students could
pursue their studies on a full-time basis and earn a diploma in three
years; the other would be "a four year night program"1 0 that would
cater to those who had already earned a bachelor's degree and who
were working in the government civil service. In 1963, a total of
sixty-one students were enrolled in both programs, and in 1964
another separate continuing legal education-type program was
added, with some four hundred already practicing lawyers and judges
participating."'
Furthermore, Paul insisted on ensuring that his law teachers were
"assigned to one course only. .. "152 There was a dual purpose for
enacting this norm early-on. The first was so that research and writ-
ing could be encouraged to flourish.'' Indeed, in that first year, the
law faculty produced a project that involved compiling a great
141 This idea draws on specifically Paul's observation, id. at 24, where he remarks,
given this Poundian situation, that "Ethiopia was a classic example."




1s2 Id. Participants in the latter earned a certificate upon completion.
152 Id. at 66.
153 Id.
amount of material on the land tenure situation in Ethiopia.154 Also
during Paul's tenure as dean (1963-1967), the Journal of Ethiopian
Law became a regular publication, and a fully-operational law
library-with some 10,000 volumes-emerged at the law school.'"'
But the second reason was so that the law faculty could have time
to interact and build relationships with members from other aca-
demic units on campus. 5 6
Nevertheless, issues still existed-serious ones at that. Paul wrote
detailed letters back to colleagues in the United States insisting that
he needed more funding to continue to implement his initiatives.
One letter, from March 1964, was written to Harvard Law's Joseph
Leininger, who was then the school's Secretary of International Legal
Studies. In it, Paul expressed his disappointment after learning that
Harvard would not fund one of its recent law graduates, Harrison
Dunning, to teach at Haile Selassie University.5 7 Because of Dun-
ning's previous work in Kenya on land law, and the fact that Ethiopia
had adopted a Civil Code that was to "displace a considerable body
of traditional [land] law"158 of its own, Paul considered it key to
"having a man of Mr. Dunning's caliber associated with"' 9 his fac-
ulty. Paul had solicited Harvard mainly because of the frustration
he encountered with SAILER administrators regarding the delay in
delivering funding to the law school. 160
154 Id.
1ss Id. at 67-68 (referring to it imprecisely as the Ethiopian Law Journal). Peter
H. Sand has comprehensively compiled what he has titled a "Bibliography of Pub-
lications by Former Foreign Faculty Members and Visiting Lecturers, Addis Ababa
University Faculty of Law." The entries include many citations to articles published
in the Journal of Ethiopian Low (sent by Sand to author; on file with author.)
1s6 Here a number of activities occurred. For example, the university initiated a
lecture series and mentoring program for students on their research and writing
skills. Id. at 66-67. In addition, in the fall of 1964 a new initiative (in English) was
launched and directed towards "government officials, prosecutors, judges, mem-
bers of parliament and advocates." Id. at 66. Note, this program was in total three
years and provided graduates with an actual diploma. Another track of studies
was offered as well, in criminal law, criminal procedure, and military law to a sim-
ilar set of constituents who lived in the city of Asmara, and this was two-and-one
half year program. Id.
17 Letter from James C.N. Paul to Joseph E. Leininger (Mar. 25, 1964) (on file
with author).
158 James C.N. Paul, Reference Letter for Harrison Dunning 1 (Mar. 25, 1964).
1I Id. at 2.
160 Indeed, in the letter to Leininger, it appears that Paul sent a copy to Frank Sutton
as well. (Although, officially Sutton was not copied on the letter). The reason it
In April of 1964, Paul wrote to Ford arguing that if the Haile
Selassie law faculty were to succeed, the support from Ford needed
to be quickened and enhanced, especially for faculty hires.16' There
had to be additional resources devoted towards the library, towards
producing more casebooks, and towards developing pedagogical
tools to assist new instructors on how to teach.'6 2 And Paul insisted
that there be greater "Ethiopianization"' 6 of the faculty, urging the
SAILER-administrators to invest more heavily in training local
Ethiopians to enter into the academy.
These pressures weighed heavy on Paul, to the point where he
remarked that he could not "rest easy till we get this [set of financial
matters] out of the way-because these are commitments already
made and vitally relevant."16 4 In fact, Paul's unease was so manifest
that he wrote a follow-up correspondence to Francis Sutton in New
York reiterating his worry about the "red-ink position"165 of the law
school and the strong likelihood that the institution would be have
to incur "deficit-financing." 6 6 Paul's anxiousness over the lack of
necessary funding continued into the following year. In March of
1965 he made an "urgent plea"1 67 to Sutton to increase funding
for the Ethiopian law school. He even privately confessed to Sutton
how he had become "tired . . . [and] discouraged" with the entire
endeavor.6 8
appears so, is because on the copy the author has, which came from the Ford
Foundation, where Sutton worked, there is a hand-written note from Paul that
reads: "Dear Frank: When are you coming []? [bracketed word illegible]. And what
on earth is happening in New York to SAILER's application?!! We look forward to
seeing you. Jim."
161 See Letter from James C.N. Paul to Francis X. Sutton and Courtney A. Nelson
(Apr. 13, 1964) (on file with author) (bemoaning the fact that because of a lack of
funding Paul could not retain the services of Kenneth Redden, who would later go
on to be a prominent professor at the University of Virginia).




16s See Letter from James C.N. Paul to Francis X. Sutton (Apr. 17, 1964) (on file
with author).
166 Id.
167 See Letter from James C.N. Paul to Francis Sutton (Mar. 10, 1965) (on file with
author).
16 Id. (although as he quickly added, as if to comfort Sutton: "I assure you I have
never had more zest for a project, nor more stimulation, nor more hope that I am
Eventually, the funding for which Paul worked relentlessly arrived.
In April 1965, Ford approved a new, nearly one million dollar, three-
year grant.169 For the next eighteen months Paul continued attempt-
ing to strengthen the quality of education and diversify the faculty,
although through the calendar year, 1966, the teachers remained
predominantly Western-based. Along with the nine SAILER-sup-
ported American teachers, Paul also had the occasional teacher
funded by the United States Peace Corps, plus there were faculty
members from Britain, West Germany, Belgium, and Poland.170 Still,
Paul aspired for the eventual "Ethiopianization of [the] faculty,"'17
even though he worried that this may be "a long way off."172
By 1967 university officials and the government asked Paul to as-
sume the role of Vice President of Academic Affairs for the entire
institution, which he accepted. Paul's resilience impressed his su-
periors. Although the law faculty by 1967 no longer offered a part-
time, four year LL.B. program, the three year program remained and
was thriving, as were other short-term courses for government of-
ficials and working professionals. 73 But what would become of
engaged, with other fine people, in a task which may truly yield tangible fruit in
the course of time.").
"I The archival documents are unclear as to how much money specifically was
allocated to Ethiopia. The official grant application, File #62-293 (Apr. 12, 1965),
notes that a three year grant of $991,000 was approved, and the accompanying
letter by Ford to Mr. Kenneth Holland, President of the Institute of International
Education (the body administering the grant) confirms the same. However
nowhere in the grant application or in the letter to Holland is Ethiopia mentioned
as the sole beneficiary. At the same time, in a letter dated April 15, 1965 from
Francis Sutton to James Paul, the former notes that Ford "has now approved a
grant of slightly over $1,000,000 to continue the SAILER program and it is my un-
derstanding that appointment under that program will be available to you in Addis
Ababa." The principle actors with whom the author spoke (Sutton and Paul) did
not have recollection on the specific amount devoted to the Halie Selassie Univer-
sity. Note also that in March of 1965, Sutton received a correspondence from his
deputy, Courtney Nelson, who was the liaison between New York and East Africa.
In it, Nelson extols the progress Paul has made and resoundingly affirms his belief
that support from Ford should continue. See Courtney A. Nelson Memo to Francis
X. Sutton (Mar. 19, 1965) (on file with author).
170 See Ford Foundation Memo on the University of Haile Selassie I, Law School,
Addis Ababa 11 (Jan. 27-29, 1966) (on file with author).
171 Id.
172 Id.
us Memorandum, Faculty of Law, Haile Selassie I University, Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia 2 (Feb. 4, 1964) (on file with author).
the law faculty with his departure? The next section examines the
Haile Selaisse law school in the years following Paul's deanship.
2. The Post-Paul Era
By 1967, the Addis law school was becoming a vibrant place of
learning.174 Thus with James Paul's shift into university administra-
tion, the institution needed a new able dean. SAILER officials in New
York recruited Yale Law School Professor Quintin Johnstone to fill
this role. 7 s Johnstone was previously based in Tanzania and had a
good relationship with SAILER director, John Bainbridge. However,
succeeding Paul was a difficult task and Johnstone was keenly aware
of the challenges he faced. 7 6 Yet Johnstone's approach for how to
run the law school was embraced not just by his American overseers
but by the Ethiopians with whom he interacted. The reason was
simple: Johnstone also advocated strongly for fully turning over
legal education to the Ethiopians.' 7 Some months before his ap-
pointment, Johnstone delivered a lecture at a SAILER-held sympo-
sium in New York where he expressed concern that African law
schools had engaged in "too much mimicry as to what [was]
done in England and the United States."178
For Johnstone, the curriculum had to focus on training lawyers
who could be efficient government officials as well as those who
114 Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 68 (note, Tuori finds that "by
1967 [there were] close to 700 students in its various program in English and
Ahmaric."). See Kauis Tuori, Legal Pluralism and Modernization: American Law Pro-
fessors in Ethiopia and the Downfall of the Restatements of Customary Law, J. LEGAL
PLURALISM at 10-11 (forthcoming).
11s Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 68.
176 Interview with Quintin Johnstone (Mar. 18, 2011).
177 Id. See also interview with a current member of the Addis law faculty (who
were SAILER students and who vividly recalled Johnstone's deanship approach)
(Aug. 6, 2010); interviews with members of the Addis Ababa Law Alumni Associa
tion (Aug. 7, 2010).
178 Symposium on the Special Curricular Needs and Problems of Law Faculties
in Anglophonic Africa, Memo on the Project on the Staffing of African Institutions
of Legal Education and Research, The Institute of International Education (Sept. 9,
1966) (on file with author.) Note also, Kaius Tuori has written an important paper
that discusses how Professor Arthur Schiller (the founder of the African Law Center
at Columbia) devoted great effort at trying to revitalize rigorous study of indige-
nous law in Ethiopia. As Tuori explains, Schiller's efforts occurred and coincided
with the law-and-development efforts like that of SAILER's. For a detailed discus-
sionof Schiller's work in this area, see Tuori, supra note 174.
were fluent in local criminal and family law matters.7 9 He also be-
lieved African legal education needed to address the fundamental
issues concerning state governance, such as "agricultural develop-
ment, urban land use and development, government organization
and administration and public health."s 0 And he argued that the
law faculty had to be centrally involved in: continuing legal educa-
tion for practitioners, a vast array of law reform and empirical legal
studies projects, legal aid clinics that could be "relevant to the
masses,""" and efforts to train students to be solid researchers.'8 2
Johnstone did not believe that foreign expatriates could impart
these goals independently and without local assistance. To that end,
he made it his primary objective to bring onto the permanent fac-
ulty Ethiopians who could lead these initiatives.8 3
This plan was continued by Johnstone's successor, Cliff Thomp-
son, who had been in Zambia and Sudan on SAILER-related projects
before coming to Addis to assume the deanship in 1969. Thompson
also previously served as Associate Director for Columbia Law School's
African Law Center (ALC) where one of that institute's major goals
was to promote African legal studies among American scholars.184
As part of this process, the ALC published the African Law Digest,
which was the flagship journal in the United States for legal scholars
interested in law-related developments in Africa.18
179 See Symposium on the Special Curricular Needs, supra note 178. See also in-
terview with Quintin Johnstone (Mar. 18, 2011).
180 See Symposium on the Special Curricular Needs, supra note 178, at 5.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 5-6.
"Is Interview with Quintin Johnstone (Mar. 18, 2011); Johnstone's goal was to
hire three Ethiopians a year. While he fell short of this goal, by the time he left in
1969, a total of three Ethiopians were on staff. Also note that as of October 16,
1967, the period in which Johnstone began his tenure, the following people were
SAILER teachers at Haile Selassie I University Law: Richard Cummings, Harrison
Dunning, William Ewing, Stanley Fisher, Quintin Johnstone, Michael Kindred, Lau-
rence Knowles, John B. Marshall, Paul McCarthy, Norman Singer, and Peter Strauss.
See Ford Foundation Memorandum, Current SAILER Teachers (Oct. 16, 1967) (on
file with author).
184 See Letter from Cliff Thompson to John Bainbridge (Feb. 8, 1966) (describing
the African Law Center) (on file with author).
185 Id. As noted, the ALC was founded by Professor Arthur Schiller. Along with
the African Law Digest, the ALC published the African Law Studies. In the late
1960s, Professor Richard Abel assumed the editorial functions of the ALS; it even-
Thompson served as the third dean of the Haile Selassie law
faculty from 1969-1973. During that time legal life on campus was
intellectually exciting but there were external political events that
posed challenges to those living in the capital city.186 In the early
1970s, protests against the Emperor occurred. There were shoot-
ings on campus by the Emperor's security officials; at one point, the
student class president was murdered with his body subsequently
stolen from the burial site. Marxism and anti-Americanism (partic-
ularly regarding the United States' presence in Vietnam) were ide-
ological forces that mobilized many of the young. And as former
SAILER students stated, there was suspicion among some Ethiopians
at the university that the American law teachers were tied to the
CIA. 187
But most interestingly, in spite of these dangerous developments,
inside the law school the legal training of the SAILER students con-
tinued. Funding from Ford remained. Matriculation rates steadily
rose as did the Ethiopianization of the law faculty. In fact, by the
time Thompson departed for a new teaching post at Southern
Methodist University in 1973, twelve of the twenty-one teachers
on staff were Ethiopians.'88 As one now-prominent Ethiopian lawyer
and student during the Thompson years articulated, for him and his
fellow students being part of SAILER was "emotionally schizo-
phrenic." 89 While the outside world appeared to be tearing apart
at the seams-and while there was some ideological attraction to
opposing the Emperor-being in law school served as a refuge from
the chaos. The educational confines provided academic stimulation,
tually evolved into the Journal oftegal Pluralism. Author correspondence, Profes-
sor Richard Abel, Aug. 16, 2011. For further background on Schiller, see Tuori,
supra note 174.
186 Interviews with Cliff Thompson (Mar. 15, 2011 and Aug. 25, 2010). See also
interviews with current members of the Addis law faculty (Aug. 6, 2010); inter-
views with members of the Addis Ababa Law Alumni Association (Aug. 7, 2010).
1' The description of these events comes from interviews conducted with cur-
rent members of the Addis law faculty, August 6, 2010, and with members of the
Addis Ababa Law Alumni Association, during a general meeting of this body that
took place on August 7, 2010. (Indeed, even James Paul conceded that he heard-
much to his bewilderment-that some of the students saw him and his colleagues
as operatives of the American government. Author interview, Dec. 14, 2010).
1s Interview with Cliff Thompson (Mar. 15, 2011).
189 Interview with lawyer (Aug. 7, 2010) (who asked to remain anonymous).
creativity, and as this lawyer stated, "hope"o90 that law could be
used as a means of bringing rationality, opportunity, and equality
to the vast majority of Ethiopians who had been deprived of so
much for so long.
Shortly after Thompson's departure, Paul left as well, and even-
tually, by1975, the SAILER initiative in Ethiopia ended. That same year
and in the years subsequent, the country was engulfed in violent
political turmoil that resulted in the overthrow of Haile Selassie.' 9'
The brutal military regime known as the Derg soon came to power
and oversaw a reign of terror that lasted until 1987.192 The political
climate obviously did not auger well for aspirants of rigorous, inde-
pendent legal education and there was little ambition from abroad
to devote further resources for such a venture. As will be seen next,
macro-political factors affected the Ford Foundation's decision-mak-
ing processes in two other African countries as well.
B. The Case of Ghana
As described in Sections I and II, Ford's involvement with Ghana
dated back to the late 1950s. The 1962 conference on legal educa-
tion in Accra highlighted Ford's commitment to Ghana and its desire
to work with those who sought foreign assistance to improve the
status of the country's legal profession. One fact that the Ghanaians
and Americans recognized was how few solicitors existed. One report
even cited that as late as 1964-seven years after Ghana declared
independence from Britain-only a dozen or so solicitors were
present in the entire country.'9' Remember also that there was a
bifurcation of legal education in Ghana. At the University of Ghana-
Legon, which opened in 1959, law was taught as an undergraduate
degree in the Department of Law at the University College. From
there, professional/practical training occurred at the Ghana Law
School. 94 Initially, the Briton, Professor J.H.A. Lang, headed both in-
190 Id.
191 Scholars studying this period note that the Selassie regime engaged in cor-
ruption, authoritarianism, and widespread suppression of political opponents. See
generally MARCUS, supra note 139; PANKHURST, supra note 139.
192 See e.g., MARCUS, supra note 139; PANKHURST, Supra note 139.
19 3 See William B. Harvey, The Development of Legal Education in Ghana, an in-
ternal report, as cited in BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 18.
194 Note the latter technically came into existence one year prior to the former.
stitutions, but by 1962 he resigned after clashing with President
Kwame Nkrumah.
Nevertheless, SAILER-officials remained hopeful and even invited
President Nkrumah to deliver the keynote address before the 1962
Legon conference. Nkrumah's stated priorities for Ghanaian legal
education seemed to intersect with the perspectives of people like
John Bainbridge, James Paul and the other American delegates. 95
For example, Nkrumah noted that in the Ghanaian context law had
to be used for enhancing socioeconomic opportunities.196 Legal ed-
ucation also had to import the best practices from the West but
then adapt them to the needs of future Ghanaian lawyers, including
ensuring that Ghanaian law students were trained in local custom-
ary law.'97
In spite of the skepticism expressed by earlier Ford consultants
such as A.N. Allott, and Ford's private concerns that Nkrumah was
not the pluralist that he promoted himself to be, by 1963 the
SAILER-leadership opted to provide "the most substantial assistance
to a single institution (University of Ghana] under the program" 98
to date. To replace Lang in leading the law faculty at the university,
prominent Michigan Law Professor W. Burnett Harvey was per-
suaded to assume the role of dean-a major coup for Bainbridge
and his SAILER-team. 99
Harvey, a Navy veteran from the Second World War, became a
faculty member at Michigan, his law school alma mater, in 1951. A
legal philosopher and contracts scholar, Harvey also studied com-
parative law and had a keen interest in post-colonial Africa.2 00 After
195 Nkrumah's speech was reprinted as: Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana: Law in Africa,
6 J. AFR. L. 103 (1962).
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Ford Memorandum, Request for Grant Action, Request No. OD-1257G 2 (June
3, 1963) (on file with author).
19 See id.; see also Ford Memorandum, Request for Grant Action, Request No.
OD-998G 3 (Apr. 27, 1962) (on file with author).
200 This information comes from a webpage dedicated to Harvey on the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law website, see William B. Harvey Bio, MICHIGAN LAw, http://www.
law.umich.edu/historyandtraditions/faculty/FacultyLists/AlphaFaculty/Pages/W
illiamBHarvey.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). For a tribute to Harvey's career,
see In Memoriam: Celebration of the Life of William Burnett Harvey, 80 B.U. L. REV.
692 (2000) (tributes by Ronald A. Cass, John Silber, and Todd Klipp).
his deanship at Legon, Harvey would go on to write a book on "law
and social change in Ghana,"2 01 and his interest in the region would
continue throughout the rest of his academic career, including while
dean at Indiana University-Bloomington and later as a professor at
Boston University. His tenure at the University of Ghana, while short,
would prove to be of great importance for the SAILER program.
Upon his arrival in Accra, Harvey made it a point to pursue a fac-
ulty hiring strategy similar to the one espoused by his colleagues in
Ethiopia. Namely, Harvey strongly believed that a Ghanaian pres-
ence was required in order to establish legitimacy among the stu-
dents, his domestic audiences, and-the international community.
He adamantly did not want even an appearance that he was leading
a new group of foreigners to impart legal wisdom from abroad.
While this may have been somewhat inevitable, he soon had many
Ghanaians affiliated with the faculty. By the fall of 1963, there were
nine Ghanaians who taught in either a full or part-time capacity, in-
cluding S.K.B. Asante, who would become one of the country's most
famous academics and lawyers in the twentieth century.202
Beyond diversifying the faculty, Harvey's main stamp on the
institution came in the way of transforming the manner in which
students could enter the legal profession. Prior to his arrival, the
University of Ghana awarded a four-year LL.B. degree, which was
then followed by a one-year professional tutelage at the Ghana Law
School. However, through consultation and negotiations with gov-
ernment officials and members of the bar, Harvey gained consensus
to move all legal education training under the auspices of the uni-
versity. Students, thereafter, would first earn "a three-year, non-
professional law degree, to be called the Bachelor of Arts (Honours)
in Law, and [then subsequently] a two-year, professional Bachelor
of Laws Degree." 203 The idea, from both the SAILER staff as well as the
Ghanaians involved in this transition, was that law needed to be
first studied not vocationally but rather intellectually and academi-
201 See WILLIAM BURNETT HARVEY, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN GHANA (1966).
202 The eight others included, D.K. Afreh, W.C. Ekow Daniels, A.N.E. Amissah,
Kwasi Gyeke-Dako, J.K. Agyemang, Thomas Mensa, George K. Ofosu-Amaah, and
Justice NA. Ollennu. See Letter from William Burnett Harvey to the Vice Chancellor
of the University of Ghana (Conor Cruise O'Brien), (Sept. 25, 1963) (on file with
author).
203 Id. at 2.
cally; thereafter rigorous professional training could occur.204 In his
briefings to university officials, Harvey repeatedly touted the cre-
dentials of his faculty to perform both tasks.2 05 The Ghanaians, in par-
ticular were clearly accomplished and productive, and for Harvey,
highlighting their various feats served as powerful examples from
which his superiors and the law students could gain inspiration.2 06
This legal education work might have continued for years had
Harvey and his colleagues operated within a vacuum. Like in
Ethiopia, however, such was not the case in Ghana. Larger political
factors soon impeded the functioning of the law faculty. To begin,
the university, by law, fell under the chancellorship of President
Nkrumah. 207 The Vice Chancellor was an Irishman, Conor Cruise
O'Brien. O'Brien's long public career would eventually include stints
in journalism, civil service, and elected politics.2 08 At the University,
O'Brien's position ran the gamut from serving as the day-to-day
manager of all administrative affairs, the faculty representative to
the government, and the final overseer of all student matters.2 09
The relationship between Nkrumah and O'Brien was complicated;
initially the two worked well together but over time as Nkurmah
consolidated his power over both the political and university worlds,
O'Brien would become an adversary.2 10
204 Id. Also, this view was conveyed during interviews that took place in Accra
with a group of faculty members at the University of Ghana Law Faculty, August
9, 2010. See also, interview with two senior, current practicing lawyers, in Accra,
who were intimately familiar with the SAILER program and the Ford Foundation's
efforts during the 1960s (Aug. 10, 2010).
205 See Letter from William Burnett Harvey to the Vice Chancellor of the Univer-
sity 4-5 (Sept. 23, 1963).
206 See id. (in particular Harvey's description of the Ghanaians contributions to
a range of publications, including the nascent University of Ghana Law Journal
(heretofore, the Legon Law Journal)).
207 This section will draw on the insightful biography, DONALD H. AKENSON, CONOR:
A BIOGRAPHY OF CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN 226-54 (1994).
208 See generally id.
209 Id. at 226-54.
210 Id. This is not to intimate that O'Brien did not passionately believe in his views
that ran counter to Nkrumah. For a discussion of this point, see id. Also, involved
in what O'Brien considered meddling was Ghana's Attorney General Geoffrey Bing,
who served from 1957-1961 and then as an advisor to Nkrumah until his being de-
posed in 1967. Id. at 225. Akenson describes Bing as irritating O'Brien because of
"Bing's attempting to insinuate himself into the management of the university."
Id.
The transition of the Gold Coast-born Nkrumah (or as he was
sometimes referred to as Osaygefo211) from an American educated
theology and philosophy student to the dominant leader of post-
independent Ghana has been discussed at length by various scholars.212
Relevant here is that vis- -vis the university, Nkrumah intervened
much more into the affairs of the faculty following an assassination
attempt on him in 1963. A special court headed by the Chief Justice
of Ghana, Arku Korsah, acquitted three of the five defendants, and
in response the President removed Korsah from office later that
year.213 O'Brien and'his university colleagues argued that this action
was unconstitutional, and thereafter Nkrumah and his allies viewed
(with even more scrutiny) the Ghana faculty as a serious threat to
the government's authority. After a series of intimidating measures
taken by the President,214 in late January of 1964 the government
ordered Harvey and his close SAILER colleague, Robert B. Seidman,
deported. Through connections Seidman's friends and his wife (the
economist Ann Seidman) had with Nkrumah, he was allowed to re-
turn to Accra (although Harvey was not); but Seidman left Ghana
shortly thereafter for Lagos, Nigeria after learning that a colleague
who he believed was behind his deportation soon became dean of
the law faculty.215
211 See id. (the term translated from the language Twi means "redeemer," or
"leader").
212 See id. at 226-54. See also JUNE MILNE, KWAME NKRUMAH: A BIOGRAPHY (2006).
2113 See AKENSON, supra note 207, at 226-54; ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, THE NEW YORK
TIMES, 20TH CENTURY IN REVIEW: POLITICAL CENSORSHIP 260 (2001).
214 See AKENSON, supra note 207, at 226-54 (as Akenson discusses, in early 1964
another failed assassination attempt was made on Nkrumah. Further, in this dis-
cussion that Akenson describes, Nkrumah ordered the closing of the university
campus. He sent police forces to intimidate peaceful student protesters. He had
faculty detained [e.g., a Briton, Dr. D.G. Osborne and a Ghanaian, Dr. J.C. de Graft-
Johnson]. And he (Nkrumah) outlined six specific demands on the Vice Chancellor,
O'Brien, regarding how the President needed to be more intimately involved in
university affairs ranging from teaching appointments to university scholarship to
various committee-workings).
215 Following his deportation, Seidman left for Ethiopia, then to Tanzania, and
then to Britain before returning briefly to Ghana. See author correspondence with
Robert Seidman (July 28, 2011). See also AKENSON supra note 207, at 247-54. Here,
as Akenson discusses, it is unclear whether Nkrumah himself ordered the depor-
tation of the two Americans. According to Akenson's account, the security forces
appeared to concede to Vice Chancellor O'Brien that Nkrumah did not know about
the specific order; indeed in his letters condemning this action to Nkrumah, O'Brien
The departures of Harvey and Seidman devastated SAILER's pro-
gram in Ghana. Although Harvey had convinced the government to
allow the remaining SAILER-funded teachers (Vern Davidson, Judith
and Michael Thoyer, and Jeremy Harrison, see table 1 above) to fin-
ish out the 1963-1964 academic year, for all intents and purposes,
substantively and symbolically, Bainbridge and his colleagues con-
cluded that "[flurther continuance ... [was] impossible without
compromising one's intellectual independence."2 16
In 1966, Nkrumah's government was overthrown in a military
coup while the President was on a visit to North Vietnam and China.
Seidman, thereafter, returned to Ghana and received a chaired pres-
idential professorship from the new government.2 17 However, hopes
for fully re-launching SAILER's investment in the country were dashed
when in April of 1967 another coup occurred, which led Seidman and
his family to depart from Ghana. (He would soon take up a faculty
appointment at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law School.2 18)
The ultimate assessment by Bainbridge of the Ghana project was
mixed. On the one hand, he believed that the years in which Harvey
was able to lead the school raised the caliber of education and
greatly benefitted the students. Indeed, in interviews with Ghana-
ian SAILER students, this sentiment was corroborated.2 19 Moreover,
states that he hopes that the President did not know about the order and that if
he did, then O'Brien emphasizes that his "continued tenure as Vice-Chancellor
would serve no purpose." Id. at 249. Note, as Akenson also discusses, and as con-
firmed in an interview with Professor Seidman, (Author interview, June 20, 2011),
Harvey and Seidman's names were given to the government by their colleague,
W.C. Ekow Daniels, who would soon thereafter go on to lead the law faculty as
dean. See also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 35. Note Professor Seidman's wife, the
economist Ann Cox Seidman, stayed back in Accra to continue as a lecturer in the
economics department. As she noted, they had five young children who were in
school (three in the prestigious Achimoto boarding school), and so because of this
and her commitment to her students, she remained. (She commuted back-and-
forth to Lagos, Nigeria, where her husband had taken an appointment on the law
faculty there.) Interview with Ann Seidman (June 20, 2011).
216 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 69.
217 See interview with Robert B. Seidman (June 20, 2011). For details why Seid-
man wanted to return, seesupra text accompanying note 215 (namely, discussing
the family reasons that brought him back).
218 Id. Interestingly, SAILER did opt to fund one teacher for a two year period
during this political instability. See Table 1 above in the text, noting David B.
Bryson's tenure in Accra.
219 Author interviews occurred on August 8 and August 9, 2010.
following the 1967 coup, the university faculty hired Dr. Alex A.
Kwapong, a highly respected classics scholar, to serve in the central
administration. Kwapong sought funding from SAILER and wanted
to move the institution in the direction initiated by Harvey.22 0 In ad-
dition, the law school saw Thomas Mensah, another well thought-
of scholar, elevated to Acting Dean; and by this time the law faculty
was completely staffed by Africans.22 1
Still, Bainbridge expressed angst over the many uncertainties that
surrounded legal education within the country. There had been a
serious reduction in government financial support for students
wishing to pursue a law degree.222 The Ghana Law School-the in-
stitution that was closed because of a general agreement that it was
underperforming-reopened. 2 23 In fact, to the dismay of the uni-
versity law faculty, the Ghana Law School soon gained "exclusive ju-
risdiction over the teaching of Company Law, Evidence, Civil
Procedure, Family Law, and Taxation" 2 24 -courses all deemed to be
crucial to the curriculum of the university.225 These factors and the
larger political context were too overwhelming for SAILER. By the
end of the 1960s SAILER's on-the-ground efforts all but ended in
Ghana. A similar outcome, as will be seen next, emerged in Nigeria
as well.
C. The Case of Nigeria
With its vast territory, diverse linguistic, ethnic, and religious pop-
ulations, and its own political upheaval, Nigeria posed arguably the
greatest challenge for the SAILER project during the 1960s. The elite
segment of the Nigerian bar was already incredibly sophisticated,
220 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 69.
221 Id. at 70.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 70-71.
224 Id. at 71. Note this feeling of dismay was conveyed to the author by SAILER
students in Ghana who knew Dr. Mensah and his other colleagues. Interview with
two former Ghanaian SAILER students, who are now prominent lawyers in Accra
(Aug. 9, 2010).
225 The explanation for this shift seems to be that the Ghana Law School was
staffed by people who had vested interests and closer allegiances to the govern-
ment, whereas there remained great suspicion by state leaders towards the faculty
at the university. Interview with two former Ghanaian SAILER students, who are
now prominent lawyers in Accra (Aug. 9, 2010).
prompting one former SAILER teacher to narrate a story about how
when he came to Nigeria in his mid-twenties, fresh out of law
school, he had an opportunity to meet with a member of the coun-
try's Supreme Court. The Justice informed the American that he was
educated in England, as was his father, as were other relatives-to
which the American remembered thinking to himself, "What in the
world do I have to offer here?"2 2 6
But as this young SAILER teacher learned from this Justice, as well
as from other accomplished lawyers and judges in the country,
many Nigerians affirmatively requested the assistance of the Amer-
icans, specifically to help train those aspiring law students who
could not afford to travel abroad to study.227 Still, as the archival
documents show, Nigeria confounded Bainbridge and his col-
leagues, who had difficulty grasping the complexities of how best
to structure the program's objectives. At the 1962 African legal ed-
ucation conference in Ghana, a delegation of Nigerians suggested
having Ford fund two law faculties-one in the southern, more
Christian region of lbadan and the other in the north, which was
predominantly Muslim. 228 The Americans initially acquiesced, with-
out doing enough due diligence, and only later came to learn that
"two law faculties for Nigeria was unrealistic . ."229 Political as well
as religious and ethnic factors mandated that law faculties be
established in multiple regions. As Bainbridge would write some
years later:
As it turned out, lbadan was the only Nigerian University which never
established a law faculty [italics added]. Law [however] was among the first
faculties in the other four [already present] universities, Amadu Bello [Zaria],
Ife, Lagos, and the University of Nigeria at Nsukka.230
Rather than devoting resources to starting new law schools, the
SAILER-project opted to work with these pre-existing institutions.
Lagos received particular attention from New York, given that it was
the capital and political and economic hub of the country. But the
226 Interview with former SAILER teacher (June 21, 2011).
227 Id. See also interviews with five different senior lawyers in Lagos, Nigeria who
were intimately familiar with the SAILER-project (Aug. 4-5, 2010).
228 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 37-39; see also Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJ-
ECT, supra note 9, at 80-88.
229 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 38.
230 Id.
amount of SAILER-support was modest. Between 1962 and 1965,
SAILER provided funding for only two faculty lines, Andrew Park and
Robert Seidman. The latter came to Lagos from Ghana in 1964.231
One reason may have been because the university was already
funding foreign scholars on its own, including the well-known British
academic, L.C.B. (Jim) Gower to head the law faculty.232
With Gower at the helm, beginning in 1962, the law faculty at
the University of Lagos (or "Unilag") engaged in a number of initia-
tives. These included shoring up its library, establishing the Nigerian
Law Journal, creating a think-tank called the Institute of Advanced
Legal Studies, and hiring erudite Nigerian teachers to bring a schol-
arly milieu to the university.33
Yet overarching politics reared its presence into the Lagos law
faculty. In early 1965, the governing body of the university failed to
reappoint the sitting Vice Chancellor to another term.234 This deci-
sion flew in the face of the faculty Senate's imprimatur of the in-
cumbent.235 When it later became known that the governing body's
replacement was from the Yoruba ethnic tribe-the majority con-
stituency in this part of the country-outrage ensued. 2 36 (The
incumbent was an lbo tribe member.) Students went on strike and
many faculty members loudly protested; in response the govern-
ing body sacked five deans across campus, including Gower.2 37 To
protest that move, several law faculty members-Nigerians and
Westerners-resigned, including Seidman who by then had received
231 See Table 1 above; see also interview with Robert Seidman who discussed
this modest SAILER support for the Lagos faculty during his time there (June 20,
2011).
232 See short version of curriculum vitae of L.C.B. Gower (on file with author).
233 Interview with Robert B. Seidman (June 20, 2011); see also Bainbridge, THE
SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 80. Prior to this post, Gower was Professor Emer-
itus at Southampton University and had served as a key advisor to the British De-
partment of Trade, the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, and
the Nigerian Council of Legal Education. See source cited supra note 232.
234 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 40. The governing body was known as the
Provisional Council, and Bainbridge goes into detail about the politics surrounding
this controversy. See also Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 80.
235 See sources cited supra note 234. See also interview with Robert B. Seidman
(June 20, 2011).
236 See sources cited supra note 235.
237 See sources cited supro note 235.
permission to return to the law faculty in Ghana.238 The university
closed for months, leaving great uncertainty as to what might come
next.
Indeed what then occurred affected not just the university but
everyday life for much of the country. In January of 1966, the mili-
tary deposed President Nnamdi Azikiwe. Eight months later another
coup occurred, placing Yakubu Gowon in charge of the state.2 39 The
following year, Nigeria was engulfed in the bloody Biafran War,
where the lbo-dominated eastern part of the country attempted to
secede from the federation. Even before the war, deep tensions along
ethnic lines existed (the Vice Chancellorship controversy at Lagos
was just one snapshot); now with actual fighting taking place, there
was real question as to what would become of the Nigerian state.2 40
The Biafra War lasted three long years (1967-1970) and placed
an enormous strain on the country. Still, though, there remained
deep interest among various Nigerian law students and legal pro-
fessionals to continue to work on legal education in the country.
One senior lawyer (who was a SAILER student at the time) explained
that focusing on law and education "was a great distraction from
the crippling realities that were overcoming the nation."2 4 1 He sadly
remembered though that almost all of the SAILER teachers left Nige-
ria by the time the war commenced in 1967.242
This lawyer also stated, as did other Nigerians interviewed, that
with the virtual end to SAILER within the country, several planned
law reform projects were delayed or abandoned altogether. Con-
sider a proposal to develop a Centre for Islamic Studies at Ahmadu
238 See sources cited supra note 235; see also above text (discussing Seidman's
appointment to Presidential Professor at Ghana).
239 In the late 1990s, the BBC provided a time-line on the set of Nigerian coups
that have occurred during the twentieth century. See After Abacha, Nigeria:A His-
tory of Coups, BBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
83449.stm. See also, BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 41.
240 For a literature on this conflict that cost approximately one million lives, and
the Nigerian state more generally, see TovIN FALOLA & MATTHEW M. HEATON, THE His-
TORY OF NIGERIA (2008); DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION: EVERYDAY DECEPTION
AND POPULAR DISCONTENT IN NIGERIA (2008); FREDERICK FORSYTH, THE BIAFRA STORY: THE MAK-
ING OF A LEGEND (2007). See also After Abacha, supra note 239.
241 Interview with Nigerian SAN (Senior Advocate of Nigeria) (Aug. 5, 2010).
242 Id. This point is confirmed by Table 1 above, which shows that one SAILER
teacher, Shirley Zabell, the only woman of the group, actually stayed until 1968
before leaving.
Bello University (ABU) in the northern city of Zaria.2 43 Supportive of
the Centre were Alan Milner (an Irishman) and Victor Mackinnon
(a Scot), who each served as the inaugural and second law faculty
deans beginning, respectively, in 1962 and 1967.244 There was also
backing from the faculty comprised of Americans, Britons, and an
East Indian.2 45 Once the war broke out, however, the energy behind
making the Centre a top-flight research hub ended. 246
Other areas of law reform also stalled. There was a continuing
legal education project upon which Nigerian educators sought
SAILER-assistance.2 4 7 Bainbridge attempted to organize SAILER-
teachers to work on this effort; yet, once again, after the war started
it was difficult to find Americans willing to travel to Nigeria for this
initiative.24 8
Similarly, Nigerian educators wanted to promote instruction and
scholarship in the areas of customary law, indigenous law, and "un-
official" dispute resolution.249 Bainbridge too believed in the impor-
tance of this goal and financially supported projects that involved
collecting, sorting, and categorizing materials in these fields.250 The
difficulty was that while good research work on this front began
occurring in certain places, such as at the Islamic institute at ABU, 251
given the war, there was a limit as to how much progress could be
243 See Bainbridge, THE SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 86-88.
244 Id.
245 Id at 87 (the Americans included one teacher from SAILER and others from
programs affiliated with MIT and Syracuse University).
245 Although it must be noted that SAILER did provide some funds for library
support for ABU. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 104. Today the Centre exists and




Islamic%20Legal%20Studies (last visited Nov, 18, 2011). See also Bainbridge, supra
note 9, at 87-88.
247 Interview with two different Senior Advocates of Nigeria who discussed this
plan (Aug. 5, 2010).
248 Id. See generally BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 112-13.
249 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 113-20.
250 Id. He also supported this in other countries, including Kenya, the former
Tanganyika, Zambia, Sudan, Malawi, and Ethiopia.
251 Id. at 119.
made. 25 2 At the University of Ife's Faculty of Law, the dean, Barba-
dian-born, Sheffield University scholar O.R. Marshall, was assured
by the government that it would fund major research endeavors on
local law.253 As ethnic tensions started to flare in the mid-1960s and
then with the start of the war in 1967, the government redirected
its expenditures away from education and towards other
internal affairs.2 54
All of these examples underscore the despair many law students
felt as the larger political realities adversely affected and ultimately
disrupted their educational experiences. Importantly, though, even
as foreign teachers and foreign funding dwindled, the Nigerians
tried carrying on with their educational and professional obliga-
tions. So, for instance, Nigerian students continued to study-and
Nigerian teachers continued to teach-customary and indigenous
law. Nigerian law faculties held programs that involved training and
better preparing judges for the changing world in which they
lived.255 And Nigerian academics remained present at both domestic
and international legal education conferences, some even during
violent periods of the Biafran War.256
252 Interview with two different Senior Advocates of Nigeria who discussed this
plan (Aug. 5, 2010).
253 Interview with an American SAILER-teacher who was brought to Ife for this
purpose (June 22, 2011).
254 Id. (who noted that he left his SAILER-post one year earlier because of the
suspension in funding and because of the increased security risk that was mount-
ing in the region). Another problem was that the facilities at the actual Ife campus
took several years to complete (six years between 1961 and 1967). Students and
faculty met on the University of Ibadan campus, which was dilapidated, "some 50
odd miles [away] and a journey of almost two hours . . . ." See Bainbridge, THE
SAILER PROJECT, supra note 9, at 83.
255 See e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 113.
256 For example, Nigerian scholars participated in an international conference
on administrative law in Nairobi, Kenya in 1971, just after the war ended. See BAIN-
BRIDGE, supra note 11, at 98. A major conference in Lagos took place in August of
1970, with the focus being on criminal punishment occurring by the then-military
government. Its provocative nature highlighted that Nigerian legal academics
sought to confront and challenge what they perceived as human rights violations,
in spite of the potentially dangerous ramifications of doing so. Id. at 161-62. One year
prior, in Ghana, a research workshop took place that involved a small delegation
from Nigeria. Id. at 157. And prior to the war's commencement, but during periods
of great ethnic tension, in 1965, the Nigerian Law Teachers Association meeting
was held in Ibadan to discuss issues of pedagogy. However, because of an eventual
lack of funding, future such meetings were placed on hold. Id. at 164-65.
In 1970 the bloody civil strife finally came to an end, with a pro-
jected one million people dead in the tragic process.25 7 As the coun-
try recovered from this devastation it remained under the same
military control as before the conflict-that is until another coup
occurred in 1975 led by Murtala Muhammed, who himself was mur-
dered in 1976 and then replaced by Olusegun Obasanjo.25 8
The political instability in Nigeria as well as in other parts of Africa
during the late 1960s prompted SAILER-officials to change direction
in how they approached legal education on the continent. Specifi-
cally, the program increased the number of African legal profession-
als it funded to come to the United States. This shift in focus is
examined in the next and final section.
IV. "WE CAME TO AMERICA-AND WE
TAUGHT THEM"259
In 1967, Ford established a new funding wing in New York, the
International Legal Center (ILC). 260 Inaugurated by Ford-president
McGeorge Bundy, the ILC centered on providing financial support
to developing nations modernizing and democratizing their legal
systems. 261 Recipients could include public institutions (including
law schools), non-governmental organizations, and those hosting
conferences and rule of law programs.2 62 The ILC also pledged to
support American law schools, American lawyers, and American
faculty members who wished to help "make legal education, the
legal profession and the substance of law . .. more relevant to the
development needs ... "263 of emerging countries. Finally, the ILC
257 Much of these deaths occurred from the fact that people starved. See After
Abacha, supra note 249.
258 Id.
259 This was a quote from Ghanaian who received a fellowship to study in the
United States. He is now a senior lawyer in Accra. Interview (Aug. 9, 2010).
260 See International Legal Center, For Release Document, (archival document
for Ford Foundation) (June 13, 1967). The start-up funding for the ILC was three
million dollars, provided by Ford. See GARDNER, supra note 9 at 48-49; 126-145.
261 Id. at 2.
262 Id. at 2-4.
263 Id. at 3 (describing, in particular, the ILC's early program to help Chile, but em-
phasizing later in this release how this was the goal of the Center more generally.
Furthermore, the President of the ILC, John Howard, emphasized: "[olne fact about
this program-and this is true of all our activities-is of central importance . . ..
We are not trying to export the United States system of laws to another country.").
instituted a plan to bring foreign law students and legal profession-
als to the United States to study.
That much of SAILER's work dovetailed with the mission of the
new ILC raised questions as to how the two would co-exist. To rec-
oncile this matter, Ford decided to place SAILER within the ILC and
to name Bainbridge as the "Director for Africa."2 64 Whereas SAILER's
focus between 1962 and 1967 involved "the sending of more than
fifty American lawyers to help staff new law faculties in ten African
countries," 265 the emphasis changed after the ILC emerged. Be-
tween 1967 and 1975 less than a third of that number received ILC-
funding to travel to the continent.26 6 As the above discussion
highlights, macro-political factors across Africa caused this reduc-
tion, which thereby resulted in a concerted shift in strategy by the
Americans. During this same time period, the SAILER-ILC program
supported nearly one-hundred fifty legal professionals from seven-
teen different African countries to travel to the United States. 26 7
The person named to head the ILC was John Howard. Ford cre-
ated the ILC after a deliberate decision-making process, but its
establishment was also partly a farewell gesture to Howard for the
sixteen years of service he gave to the organization. 268 Experienced
264 Id. at 5.
265 Id. at 3-4.
266 See International Legal Center Newsletter 3 (Aug. 1975) (on file with author).
Although, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 178 (noting that between 1967 "to April
1, 1972, the SAILER Project has assisted or recruited 116 law teachers or lawyers"
to work in Africa. This number is confusing as is the wording, because the data do
not indicate whether "assisted or recruited" means that the New York office
funded Americans to work in these different African countries, or if it hired local
Africans onto these respective law faculties, or both. On page seventy-four of BAIN-
BRIDGE, supra note 11, at n.1, it might appear that it is the first option. However,
the ILC data is unambiguous that between 1967 and 1975 it funded sixty-two
Americans to teach overseas, twenty-four in Latin America and the Caribbean,
twenty-two in Asia and the Middle East, and only sixteen in Africa. One possibility
of reconciling this difference between BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at 178, and the
ILC's numbers is that on page one of the latter's document, it states: "[niot in-
cluded in this Newsletter are the . . . several Fellows who served in Africa with fi-
nancial assistance from USAID." Perhaps, then, the BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at
178, figure refers to SAILER working with the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment to help Americans travel to Africa).
267 See African Scholars Supported by the International Legal Center (Dec. 1974)
(on file with author).
268 For an intimation of this point, see Francis X. Sutton's Tribute to John Howard
(Dec. 31, 1999) (revised January 13, 2000) (on file with author). For a reiteration
of this point, see also interview with Sutton (Dec. 7, 2010).
with Ford's bureaucracy, Howard's most well-known contribution
during his Ford-years was on its International Training and Research
(ITR) program. The ITR funded international studies projects mainly
at American universities-in the aggregate amount of roughly 270
million dollars-from the mid-1950s throughout much of the fol-
lowing decade.2 69 Together Howard, Bainbridge, and Terry Wood-
a former IIE official who joined the ILC when it opened-worked on
what might be viewed as "SAILER 2.0" beginning in 1967.270
Of the almost one hundred fifty Africans assisted by SAILER-ILC,
the archival data indicate that between 1967 and 1975, eighty-
seven pursued graduate degrees, mostly LL.Ms. 2 71 SAILER-ILC also
funded students to visit the University of Wisconsin, during the
summers of 1971 and 1972, to enroll in a workshop on law and de-
velopment run by Robert and Ann Seidman. 272 Additionally, SAILER-
ILC supported Africans to visit universities for other research pur-
poses, to attend short-term courses, or to spend time observing
American court proceedings. 2 73
Interviews with the Americans and Africans affiliated with the
SAILER-ILC program indicate an agreement that these foreign visits
offered multiple benefits. Given the political tumult in much of
Africa during this time, the visits gave legal professionals from these
269 This figure and the discussion of Howard's contributions at the ITR can be
found in the tribute written to him by Francis X. Sutton, supra note 268.
270 Interview with Terry Wood (Dec. 8, 2010). SAILER 2.0. is a term that the au-
thor has labeled the program, once it fell under the auspices of the ILC.
271 See African Scholars Supported by the International Legal Center document,
supra note 267 (noting of the 87 students, per country the number of students
was: Ethiopia 13, Ghana 17, Kenya 10, Lesotho 1, Liberia 2, Malawi 1, Nigeria 14,
Sudan 3, Tanzania 7, Uganda 12, Zaire 3, and Zambia 4. Of the 87 students, SAILER-
ILC provided funds for the pursuit of the following degrees (note, this number is
higher than 87 because some students sought multiple degrees): 68 LL.Ms; 18
S.J.Ds; 3 M.L.Ss; 2 J.S.Ds; 2 M.L.Is; 1 Ph.D.; 1 M.C.L.; and 1 M.C.J. In terms of uni-
versities, these institutions received the following number of SAILER-ILC graduate
candidates for the following degrees (note the number here exceeds 87 as well,
because some of the same students pursued different degrees at different insti-
tutions): California-Berkeley 2 LL.Ms, 1 S.J.D.; Chicago: I 5.J.D.; Columbia: 15 LL.Ms,
2 S.J.Ds, 2 M.L.Ss; George Washington: 1 LL.M.; Harvard: 20 LL.Ms, 2 S.J.Ds, 1 J.S.D;
Illinois 1 LL.M.; Michigan: 1 S.J.D., 1 M.L.S.; New York University: 2 LL.Ms, 1 S.J.D.;
Northwestern 1 LL.M.; Pennsylvania: 1 LL.M., 1 M.C.L.; Queens (Ireland): 2 LL.Ms;




affected countries a safe place to concentrate on their studies.2 7 4 Of
the twenty-one Ethiopians, for example, who received SAILER-ILC
funding for one purpose or another, nearly half were in the United
States at some point in 1973, just prior to the violent revolution
that took place within the country.275 From Nigeria, where SAILER-
ILC also supported a total of twenty-one legal professionals, ten
came for periods during the Biafra War, and the remaining were
present in the United States during the military rule following the
conflict.276
Another benefit the Africans enjoyed were the academic resources
available to them. Especially for those who came to the universities,
several respondents noted that the presence of physically-sound
buildings, filled libraries, and engaged and learned teachers all con-
tributed to why they felt the experience was so rewarding. Some
did state they encountered various forms of racism in certain situa-
tions, and while these episodes were distressing, they were counter-
balanced by the positive relationships they made in and out of the
classroom.
The other extremely important benefit was that, especially for
those who earned specific degrees, having such a paper credential
provided a comparative advantage in terms of employment back
in their home countries. Yet, a tension existed as well. In many
African countries sentiments of nationalist pride and attitudes of
eschewing of all things Western permeated the political and social
landscapes. At the same time, having degrees from places like Yale,
Harvard, and Columbia (the three institutions that granted the most
LL.Ms and S.J.Ds to SAILER-ILC funded Africans) provided immense
cachet. One prominent Nigerian lawyer commented how ironic it
was that "for as much as many of them [his colleagues at the bar]
chided America, they would have loved to have my Yale degree." 277
A Ghanaian senior lawyer was even more direct: "My Yale degree
gave me more legitimacy as a lawyer here in Ghana than any other
Ghanaian degree could."2 78
274 See author interview with a senior legal educator in Ghana (Aug. 11, 2010).
275 See African Scholars document, supra note 267, at 2-5.
276 See id. at 12-14.
277 Interview with Senior Advocate of Nigeria (Aug. 5, 2010).
278 Interview with Ghanaian lawyer (Aug. 9, 2010).
With that said these two lawyers, as well as several other Africans,
hastened to point out the contributions they made to their Ameri-
can hosts. The American interviewed for this project concurred.
First, as a result of the visits, collaborative work-products emerged
in the form of articles, books, and jointly-organized conferences. The
1971 and 1972 Wisconsin workshops, for example, served as the
planning grounds for an international conference held in Zambia in
1974 on the legality of copper mining, which then resulted in a 1975
publication on the intersection of law and natural resources in Africa.2 79
Second, and related, the Africans helped to intellectually diversify
the classroom and broaden the perspectives of those who were
teaching them. As one American instructor noted, "by engaging
with our students and colleagues, we learn[ed] more-and deep-
en[ed] our insights into-the problems and possibilities of using [for
instance] institutional legislative theory and methodology to over-
come the institutional obstacles that too often block effective, peo-
ple oriented development." 280 Otherwise put, the African visitors
helped situate context for the teachers and students in ways that
the Americans-even those who had spent a great deal of time in
Africa-had difficulty doing on their own.
Third, the Africans who came to the United States served as key
bridges between different constituencies in their own countries and
the Americans with whom they interacted. Many of these relation-
ships that developed resulted in the Africans coordinating enriching
initiatives for the Americans such as government delegations, vis-
iting professorships, and student exchanges. One relationship, in
particular, was especially noteworthy. In 1975, Temple University
Law School, based in north Philadelphia, launched a study-abroad
program at the University of Ghana at Legon.281 Temple had two
Ghanaian LL.M. students a few years earlier, and its Dean, Peter
Liacouras, along with Professor Peter Sevareid, started this pro-
gram. 282 However, the project came to fruition in large part because
279 See author correspondence with Ann Seidman (June 30, 2011) (on file with
author).
280 Id.
281 Interview with retired Temple University Professor Peter Sevareid (June 30,
2011). Sevareid was a SAILER-ILC fellow in Nairobi between 1968-71 at the Kenya
Institute of Administration and then went to Temple as a faculty member in 1972.
282 Id.
a Ghanaian in Accra-John Atta Mills, the current president of
Ghana-at that time served as the main liaison for this project.
Mills, a former Fulbright and SAILER-ILC fellow, earned a graduate
degree from Stanford in the early 1970s.2 83 He was a faculty mem-
ber at the University of Ghana in 1970s, and he played a pivotal
teaching role in the Temple study-abroad program. 284 (Mills also
came to Temple as a visiting professor in 1978.)
Temple's program ran successfully for several years but then
ended, perhaps not surprisingly, because of macro-political factors.
In 1979, Jeremiah (Jerry) Rawlings led a military coup that over-
threw the sitting government. Although the Temple program con-
tinued that year and the year after, in 1981 Liacouras and Sevareid
suspended operations. Their decision was based on a food shortage
that occurred within Ghana following the coup.285 There was also
on-going political instability; Rawlings had allowed scheduled elec-
tions to proceed in 1979, and the result was that Hilla Limann and
his People's National Party came to power. But at the end of 1981
Rawlings seized power again, toppling Limann and assumed direct
control over the government.286 While Temple's presence in Ghana
ended, its affiliation with the Ghanaians did not. In 1982, the law
school welcomed Samuel Gyandoh, the Dean of the University of
Ghana Law Faculty to its campus, where he remained as a profes-
sor for the next two decades.2 8 7 Gyandoh was a prominent consti-
tutional law professor in Ghana; he had earned an LL.M. at Yale
through SAILER-ILC. 288 However he had run afoul of the regime, par-
ticularly in his criticism that the 1981 coup was unconstitutional.
Worries of reprisal led to Gyandoh fleeing, and the place where he
went was Temple. As he noted, the institutional closeness that had
283 See African Scholars document, supra note 267, at 7.
284 Interview with retired Temple University Professor Peter Sevareid (June 30,
2011).
285 Id.
286 For a discussion of the Rawlings regime and this period, see KEVIN SHILLINGTON,
THE GHANA REVOLUTION (1992); John L. Adedji, The Legacy oflJ.J. Rawlings in Ghanaian
Politics, 1979-2000, 5 AFR. STUD. QUARTERLY 1 (2001), available at http://www.africa.
ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i2al.htm.
287 Interview with retired Temple University Professor Peter Sevareid (June 30,
2011); see also interview with Samuel Gyandoh (Aug. 9, 2010).
288 African Scholars Supported by the International Legal Center document,
supra note 267.
developed between Legon and Temple made the transition possi-
ble; 28 9 and given his scholarly reputation the latter was delighted to
hire him.290
By 1976, Ford decided to re-focus its financial priorities towards
other areas, and as such support for the SAILER-program within the
ILC ended. Nevertheless, as this preceding example with Temple
highlights, the relationships that emerged from this initiative con-
tinued for years after. However, as SAILER ended, strong criticisms
arose questioning the "law-and-development" model and the Ford
program. This study concludes by discussing this critique.
CONCLUSION
As SAILER wound down, the ILC leadership curiously asked a law
student from Berkeley, Robert Listenbee, who was a summer intern,
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the entire program. Listen-
bee had done some previous volunteer work "in secondary educa-
tion and rural development projects in East Africa."291 Yet Listenbee,
by his own admission, "was not directly or indirectly involved with
the project nor did he interview a representative cross section of its
major participants."2 92 Conspicuously absent was the fact that Listen-
bee saw not one of "the [SAILER] programs in action" 293 on the
African continent, making the decision to place him in charge of
evaluating such a long-standing, majorly-funded initiative that much
more perplexing. In fact, two respected senior Ethiopian lawyers
who were students at Haile Selassie University during the early
1970s-and had learned that an evaluation was completed by
someone who never witnessed what occurred in Addis-remarked
how astonished they were by this decision. As one of these lawyers
289 Interview with Samuel Gyandoh (Aug. 9, 2010).
290 Interview with retired Temple University Professor Peter Sevareid (June 30,
2011).
291 See Robert Listenbee, Close-out Evaluation of the SAILER Project, Ford Foun-
dation Memorandum 1 (Aug. 27, 1975) (on file with author).
292 See id. at 1.
293 See internal Ford Foundation memorandum from Robert H. Edwards, then
head of the Mid-East and Africa division (July 18, 1977) (on file with author). For
his report, Listenbee relied on past Ford documents and selected interviews with
Ford officials, American SAILER teachers, and Africans who were in the U.S. on
SAILER-ILC fellowships. See also second report by Robert Listenbee, Evaluation of
MEA-ILC Programs (Apr. 1976) (on file with author).
asked, "if they [Ford officials] wanted to know what we thought, why
didn't they hire someone to come here and ask us?"294
Instead, the ILC selected Listenbee, and although he lacked the
full set of on-the-ground facts, he nevertheless submitted two sep-
arate evaluations that can only be described as blistering in their
assessments. The first report covered SAILER 1.0-from 1962-1967,
with the second assessing SAILER 2.0, when the ILC took over the
program. The two reports, which Listenbee suggested reading to-
gether,2 95 began by outlining the history and facts of the SAILER. 29 6
From there, Listenbee proceeded to provide his critique, summarily
labeling SAILER as "imperialistic," 2 97 "chauviniStiC," 298 and inhering
with "evils." 2 99 (The particular reference to American chauvinism
appeared repeatedly in his assessment. 00 ) While he conceded that
the American-teachers were enthusiastic, hard-working, and com-
petent,301 he determined that SAILER had unrealistic goals, little
impact, and was obsessed by displacing the British legal influence
on the African continent with its own American agenda.3 02
The highly-charged rhetoric continued in the second part of the
evaluation. Much of the focus here turned on his critique of the
African Law Reports (ALR), which SAILER had promoted. Once again,
Listenbee was scathing-arguing that the "long term results have
been disastrous and predictably so."303 For Listenbee, the underly-
ing policy rationale for the ALR was flawed, because in his view it
sought to shape African law in a way that would advance the Amer-
icans' agenda. 3 04
294 Interview (Aug. 7, 2010).
295 See Listenbee, Evaluation of MEA-ILC, supra note 293, at 1.
296 See Listenbee, Close-out Evaluation of the SAILER Project, supra note 291, at
1-4.
297 Id. at 5.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 7 (noting that "[tihe men who promoted the rule of law were chauvin-
istically American, cynically anti-British and filled with a missionary certitude about
the value of democracy for African nations.").
301 Id. at 5.
302 Id. at 5-9. See GARDNER, supra note 9 at 240-83.
303 See Listenbee, Evaluation of MEA-ILC, supra note 293, at 5.
304 Id. at 6 (noting also that there was great expense for Africans to afford such
material).
Listenbee additionally found fault with the fact that so few Amer-
ican law schools opened African law centers, even though SAILER
and the ILC made this a policy priority. Too little funding from Ford
and a lack of vision on the part of SAILER and ILC officials con-
tributed to why law schools did not embrace this idea. 05
Overall, Listenbee believed that the entire initiative was hindered
by the fact that people like Bainbridge, Howard, and their colleagues
simply could not face the reality that Western intervention in places
like Africa had real limitations. Try as they might, these Americans
would always be disconnected and that Ford continued privileging
this fundamentally flawed program without using objective metrics
for assessment only perpetuated an illogical policy.0
Much of Listenbee's empirics for writing his evaluation came sec-
ond-hand, mainly from a written summary by William Herman, a
Ford program officer who spent six weeks in Africa in 1970.307 Her-
man himself wrote a memo in 1977 evaluating Listenbee's critiques,
in which he agreed with the latter's ultimate conclusions, although
he found that certain objectives were met." But ultimately Herman
recommended discontinuing the funding for the ILC.309
Later that year, Francis Sutton, one of the architects of SAILER
and upon whom Listenbee interviewed for his reports, provided a
different perspective. Sutton conceded that serious American chau-
vinism existed, but he noted that the Listenbee evaluation did not
represent how he originally conceived of the program. 10 He re-
jected the charge that he was anti-British, anti-European, or that
he promoted a purely American type of law school model in Africa."'
To the contrary-Sutton championed and helped approve a major
grant for Tanzania, which had a law school that was staffed mainly
305 Id. at 7-8.
306 Id. at 8-12.
307 Id. at 9; see also W.A. Herman, Close out of grants 680-0132A, B, and C to
the International Legal Center and 620-0923, A, B, C (Mar. 30, 1977) (on file with
author).
308 See Herman, supra note 307, at 1-3 (noting that Americans went to Africa,
that Africans came to the U.S, and that more people in the U.S. had a greater in-
terest in Africa "must be considered accomplishments.").
309 Id. at 4.
310 Memo from Francis Sutton, Institute of International Education, Strengthen-
ing of African Legal Education, 62-293 (Aug. 29, 1977) (on file with author).
311 Id. at 2.
by British-trained lawyers.312 Consider also that SAILER strongly
backed L.C.B. Gower and O.R. Marshall to head law faculties in Nige-
ria, and that the American teachers in Accra worked closely with
the university's Irish-born and educated Vice Chancellor. In other
places too, like Ethiopia and Sudan, the faculties reflected a cosmo-
politan, rather than provincially-American, outlook, as evidenced
by those with whom the Americans interacted and worked.113
Sutton's rebuttal underscored a more fundamental problem with
Listenbee's analysis in that it failed to take into account the layered
natured of cultural pluralism in Africa. As discussed earlier, in many
places legal education was affected by a range of racial, tribal, reli-
gious, and linguistic sensitivities. Listenbee's report said little about
these cross-cutting dynamics. Note the case of Kenyan-born and
Oxford-educated Professor Yash Ghai. Ghai, whose grandparents
came from North India, was on the faculty at the University of Dar-
es-Salaam in the 1960s and then dean from 1969-1970. Thereafter,
he served as a visiting professor at Yale, a SAILER-ILC fellow in Up-
psala, Sweden, and since then, he has gone on to become one of
the world's foremost authorities on comparative law, legal educa-
tion, and constitutionalism. 314 Ghai's writings are broad, deep, and
nuanced; in no way would they, along with his experiences and in-
tellect, fit into the simplified categories presented by Listenbee. The
same can also be said about Professor William Twining, a Ugandan-
born Briton who has made enormous contributions to both African
and Western legal thought.3 15
312 Id.
313 Id. at 2. Supplemented with author interview of Francis Sutton (Dec. 7, 2010).
314 For a brief background on Ghai, see his Professor Emeritus website at the
Faculty of Law, THE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, http://wwwO.hku.hk/Iaw/faculty/staff/
ghai yash.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2011). See also Yash Ghai, Co-Investigator,
ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, http://www.queensu.ca/edg/members/
researchers/ghai.htmlhttp://www.queensu.ca/edg/members/researchers/ghai.html.
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011). Moreover, Ghai also provided feedback to Bainbridge
on his 1972 SAILER book, see BAINBRIDGE, supra note 11, at iv.
3Is In LAW AND JUSTICE IN TANZANIA: QUARTER CENTURY OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 5 n.3-4
(Chris Maina Peter & Helen Kijo-Bisimba eds., 2007), the editors in the introduction
provide a valuable bibliography of the various legal education, scholarly contribu-
tions made by, respectively, Ghai and Twining. For a select sample, see e.g., Yash
Ghai, Legal Radicalism, Professionalism, and Social Action: Reflections on Teaching
in Dar es Salaam, in LEGAL RADICALISM: REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF
DAR ES SALAAM (Issa Shivji ed., 1986); Yash Ghai, The Rule of Law: Legitimacy and
Governance, 14 INT'LJ. Soc. L. 179 (1986); Yash Ghai, Law, Development, and African
The point is that much of Listenbee's evaluation was too blunt.116
Given his own admitted lack of substantive bona fides regarding
SAILER, it might be enough to dismiss his report without further dis-
cussion. However, some points he raised do deserve recognition.
Listenbee rightly noted that demographically the program lacked
diversity. There were unfortunately too few women and too few mi-
norities who comprised SAILERS' staff.17 Regardless of how well the
intentions were, the reality remained that Africa had endured years
of colonial rule. Even among those Africans who stated how much
they benefitted from SAILER 1.0, there was a sense that having-as
one respondent discussed-only white men lecturing to African stu-
dents in a hierarchical manner felt too eerily similar to the previous
era. 18 Related to this, most of the American SAILER-teachers had
little to no knowledge of Africa prior to their being dispatched. 19
They were recently-minted law graduates, with minimal publica-
tions and hardly any work or teaching experience. It would be un-
usual to place such individuals in front of American law students;
that they were "good enough" for the Africans provided'an under-
standable sense of negativity from SAILER-critics. 32 0
Scholarship, 50 MOD. L. REV. 750 (1987); William Twining, Legal Education within
East Africa, EAST AFRICA TODAY (1986); William Twining, The Camel in the Zoo, in LEGAL
RADICALISM: REFLECTIONS ON TEACHING LAW AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM (Issa Shivji
ed., 1986).
16 Moreover, there are quotations and references within his report (specifically,
supra note 296) from people like Burnett Harvey, Cliff Thompson, and Robert Sei-
dman that come off as clearly supportive of his (Listenbee's) position that these
academics were grossly anti-British and pro-American. However, as seen above,
their views and perspectives were much more subtle and nuanced than Listenbee
acknowledges.
317 Id. at 11 (although noting that "this was due more to the sexist and racist
policies of higher education in American than to the Project's recruitment efforts.").
See also RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 74-112(1989) (noting that during this era
there were relatively few women and minorities who were matriculating from law
schools).
318 Interview with former SAILER-student (Aug. 7, 2010).
319 See Listenbee, supra note 291, at 11-12.
320 Although consider that from these SAILER-positions, several of these young
(and still relatively inexperienced) SAILER-teachers went straight into American
law teaching, often at very elite institutions. Author correspondence with Professor
Richard Abel (Aug. 16, 2010). The American law schools that hired these SAILER-
teachers perhaps saw this Africa experience as crucially important, in a way that
"visiting assistant professorships" (VAPs) are seen today by many appointments
By the end of 1977, Ford's funding for SAILER-ILC ceased. In 1986,
a reunion of those involved with SAILER was held in Harriman, New
York. Over fifty people affiliated with the project attended and the
transcripts from that event indicate that it was a celebratory affair
with the participants providing laudatory speeches on their various
experiences in Africa.321 Nevertheless, these two preceding critiques
resonated with and affected some of those present at the program,
including Sutton. In his remarks, Sutton too praised SAILER's efforts,
and he argued that the motivation for launching SAILER lay in that
genuine concern to assist those African nations that requested
aid.322 The SAILER teachers who worked in Africa gave years of their
lives for a cause that centered on promoting the rule of law-and
the participating African partners also believed in this same princi-
ple. 323 As he emphasized, Ford and these emerging African states
were enthusiastically caught up in a shared "Zeitgeist," 3 24 which-
more than imperialism or chauvinism-may have led to certain
"errors and follies" 325 that occurred.
At the same time, it is clear from his remarks that Sutton re-
mained troubled and somewhat stung by what had been said in the
years before, not just by Listenbee but more generally by a critical
law-and-development literature that had emerged in the 1970s. 326
committees. Also, at the first Conference on Critical Legal Studies in Madison in
1977, a number of the participants had previously been teachers, researchers, or
aid-workers in developing nations. Id.
321 See Twenty Years After, supra note 125.
322 Id. at 21-24.
323 Id.
324 Id. at 23-24.
325 Id. at 23.
326 Id. at 24. In 1977, the American Journal of Comparative Law published two
significant articles that discussed this scholarly critique and outlined the literature
written by the critics to that point. See John H. Merryman, Comparative Law and
Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of the Law and Develop-
ment Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457 (1977); Elliot M. Burg, Law and Develop-
ment: A Review of the Literature & a Critique of Scholars in Self-Estrangement, 25
AM. J. COMp. L. 492 (1977). For arguably the most important article of this period
(which Elliot Burg refers to in his title and article), see David Trubek and Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections of the Crisis of Law and
Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wisc. L. REV. 1062 (1974). See also,
DAVID M. TRUBEK & ALVARO SANTos, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL
APPRAISAL (2006).
He specifically addressed these assessments as having "excesses" 32 7
and of being "unduly severe" 32 8 and he refused to waver from his
position. As he stated:
We were no doubt more easily optimistic than we ought to have been. But
I am sure we were not wrong to try what we did. It would indeed have been
pusillanimous and wrong not to have tried. And certainly our objectives
were sound ones.3 29
In the end, what can be said is that SAILER-issues and all-was
a unique program Ford undertook during the post-World War II era.
Unlike Ford's parallel programs on legal education,330 SAILER had a
sustained a commitment in Africa by immersing its staff in the local
environments for extended periods of time. The SAILER-teachers
were not "parachute experts" who flew in, doled out advice, and
then left. Instead they were dedicated (albeit sometimes nalve and
inexperienced) individuals who entrenched themselves in their
communities and indeed tried to do their best serving people who
they believed wanted their assistance. While larger political forces
may have affected their ability to make a long-term impact, the ev-
idence marshaled above shows that among the Africans with whom
they interacted, the SAILER-teachers by-and-large had a positive in-
fluence. In sum, as academics, bar association leaders, funders, and
government officials today contemplate how to address questions
of legal education, particularly within modernizing and emerging
nations, they might well wish to consider the SAILER-experiment
and the lessons from it before enacting specific policy initiatives.
327 See Twenty-Years After supra note 125 at 24.
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330 See e.g., its program in India, Krishnan, supro note 5, or its programs involving
Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, West Germany, supro note 6.
